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ABSTRACT
Ike’s Last War: Making War Safe for Society
by Jesse A. Faugstad

This thesis analyzes how Eisenhower defined war and its utility in his New Look
defense policy and the ramifications for America’s interactions with the world through its
foreign policy. It argues that Eisenhower redefined the relationship between war and
society as he executed his grand strategy, further removing society from the decision for
war. To avoid what he believed to be the inevitable global destruction of a general war
turned nuclear, Eisenhower broadened the scope of ‘war” to balance domestic opinion for
containing communism while also avoiding the devastating consequences of war in
American society. By authorizing coups in Iran and Guatemala, Eisenhower blurred the
line between coercive diplomacy and violent political warfare. President Eisenhower’s
reliance on covert action to achieve political outcomes prevented general or nuclear war
but it strengthened an emerging model for society’s relationship with war. Political
warfare and covert action increased the gap between society and the commitment of
American power during the Cold War. In his effort to prevent war, Eisenhower expanded
presidential power and set a precedent that continues today.
.
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Introduction
If any person in 1953 could have claimed to understand war’s utility, it would
have been President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The hero-general of the Second World War
and the first Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had studied
or participated in war since his entry into the United States Military Academy in 1911.
On 9 May 1953, Eisenhower commissioned a study popularly known as Project Solarium
to “formulate and present alternative courses of action which the United States might
presently or in the future undertake with respect to the Soviet power bloc.”1 Forty-two
years after his graduation from West Point, “Ike” once again found himself in a familiar
setting—receiving a briefing from his staff on possible courses of action for his last war –
the Cold War. Late that July, Eisenhower attended a top-secret briefing presented by the
participants of each of the three task forces assigned to analyze the Soviet Union’s threat
to American national security and the options available to the president. While listening
to the briefing which offered options ranging from indirect economic confrontation to
preventative nuclear war, Eisenhower made a note on his paper. “Global war as a defense
of freedom almost a contradiction in terms.”2
What led the American president most experienced in war and its consequences to
note that contradiction? How could a Cold War president conceive of global war to save
the free world from communism as illogical?
1

Document #69, “Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium,” dated June 1, 1953,
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, Part 1,
National Security Affairs, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 360. (Hereafter referred
to as FRUS)
2

Handwritten Note, no date, DDE Diary Dec. 52 – July 52 (1), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, Ann
Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D. – Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Presidential Library (Hereafter DDEL).
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how Eisenhower defined war and its utility
in his New Look defense policy and the ramifications for America’s interactions with the
world through its foreign policy.3 It argues that Eisenhower redefined the relationship
between war and society as he executed his grand strategy, further removing society from
the decision for war. To avoid what he believed to be the inevitable global destruction of
a general war turned nuclear, Eisenhower broadened the scope of ‘war” to balance
domestic opinion for containing communism while also avoiding the devastating
consequences of war in American society. The president defined war so it would remain
a feasible coercive instrument for achieving American self-interests. To wage war,
Eisenhower blurred the line between coercive diplomacy and violent political warfare.
President Eisenhower’s reliance on covert action to achieve political outcomes prevented
general or nuclear war but it strengthened an emerging model for society’s relationship

3

What is war? For the purposes of this thesis war represents two distinct, yet related ideas. First,
war is a means of achieving policy objectives (utility). Second, war describes the various means of
employing national power to influence or compel an opponent (nuclear, general, political, psychological).
This second definition of war is commonly referred to as warfare in documents from Eisenhower’s
administration. War is often tied to the idea of victory. Military victory represents the strategic, operational,
or tactical defeat of an enemy’s corresponding military power. It is a limited aim, or more specifically, an
aim commonly thought of in a sequential process. That is, first the enemy’s military forces must be
defeated and then the political outcome will be achieved. Victory in war, however, represents the
successful application of violence in achieving policy objectives. There may be a period of time between
military victory and victory in war; enemy forces may be defeated but the political settlement does not
immediately occur. Victory at bests represents a more acceptable relationship between actors than before
the outbreak of war. In this discussion of Eisenhower’s grand strategy “war” represents achieving policy
objectives through coercion or force. When Eisenhower’s view of waging war is discussed “war” is
preceded by a modifier signifying his conceptualization of means (i.e. political warfare). Most important to
this discussion is the idea—which Eisenhower subscribed to—that war is chaotic and uncontrollable in
nature. When analyzing the president’s statements about war and conflict it is important to recognize that
Eisenhower did not believe war could be controlled or the outcome predicted.
For competing definitions of war see the following: For a discussion of war as a “social fact” that
mirrors society see Miguel A. Centeno and Elaine Enriquez, War and Society (Malden, MA: Polity Press,
2016), 4-9; For the unpredictable nature of war and an analysis of war as a “nonlinear phenomenon see
Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter, 19921993): 60-61; 5-16 For a discussion on modern war and the complications that emerge when defining war,
see Richard English, Modern War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2013), 5-16.
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with war. Political warfare and covert action increased the gap between society and the
commitment of American power during the Cold War.
Ike broadly classified war as nuclear war, general war, and political war. Nuclear
war assumed a variety of definitions during the Cold War, but for Eisenhower it
represented uncontrollable escalation to unfathomable—and unproductive—destruction
through nuclear exchange. General war meant conventional armies fighting with fully
mobilized societies backing the effort, essentially the not so distant experience of the
Second World War. While society and policymakers could readily identify nuclear war
and general war, political warfare proved to be the most important instrument of
American power and created a blurring of foreign policy and ‘war’. Asking why
Eisenhower defined war and its utility this way provides perspective on Ike’s
understanding of the Cold War and the relationship between war, foreign policy, and
grand strategy. More importantly, this thesis reveals how the American view of war and
its utility differed from that of nations subjected to American intervention. The blurring
of foreign policy and war in Eisenhower’s New Look limited his administrations
understanding of war’s consequences—both at home and abroad.
This thesis relies on National Security Council meeting notes, policy planning
documents, and personal correspondence between Eisenhower and key individuals in his
administration. Integrating these primary sources with scholarship concerning conflict,
grand strategy, and the Cold War in the Third World provides a perspective of war and its
consequences in society—both foreign and domestic. Many historians have noted
Eisenhower’s view of war and the covert nature of his foreign policy. However, there is
no study that analyzes how Eisenhower’s view of war’s utility in U.S. grand strategy

3

shaped American interventions in the early and mid 1950s. No other study analyzes how
Eisenhower’s definition of war influenced his grand strategy.
This thesis first analyzes Eisenhower’s conceptualization of grand strategy and
the key experiences and ideas that influenced him prior to entering the White House.
Second, it evaluates Eisenhower’s correspondence and comments in National Security
meetings to establish how the president defined war and its utility. The third section
considers the means Eisenhower identified to achieve American interests below the
threshold of war. The fourth assesses how Eisenhower executed his grand strategy by
examining his use of political warfare and covert regime change, in Iran and Guatemala.
Finally, this thesis describes how Eisenhower’s definition of war militarized American
foreign policy in an already war-focused national security state. This final section reveals
how Cold War policies attributed to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson
emerged during Eisenhower’s administration and the importance of defining war and
peace as America interacts with other nations.
The intention of this thesis is not to define war, peace, or how to formulate grand
strategy. Rather, it contributes to the ongoing discourse of war’s utility in grand strategy.
It analyzes the questions raised by Eisenhower and his administration, and more
importantly, the questions it prompts us to ask today as America continues to exist in an
interconnected world. The wide-ranging approaches to executing grand strategy through
diplomatic, economic, and military means that Eisenhower considered in 1953 are still
relevant today. In fact, the range of options to consider in executing grand strategy should
be approached with the same amount of study and planning that Eisenhower pursued

4

using his systemized National Security Council process.4 Foreign policy is inherently
interventionist—states seek to shape other states’ actions to advance their interest. The
negative connotation that interventionism often evokes speaks to the importance of
examining where coercive foreign policy moves closer to general war, or at the least its
characteristics.5 Eisenhower’s key policymakers understood the consequence of policies
that appeared interventionist, even suggesting that American actions be framed as
“participation” while communist actions be labeled “intervention.”6 Despite this
awareness, Eisenhower faced a vital question: where is the line between general war and
political warfare? The answer mattered as all world leaders sought to advance interests
without triggering nuclear war. A question not as evident in Eisenhower’s national
security process is one that confronts states today: how far can a state pursue its interests
in another state before society needs to sanction the use of coercive measures, to include
violence?7

4

For a review of Eisenhower’s National Security system see chapter five in Robert R. Bowie and
Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1998).
5

While interventionist and coercive may seem dramatic terms to describe the United States
interaction with other nations, it is useful to consider the power dynamic between the United States and
other states. While the United States may seek to link policies or leverage certain issues, a smaller country
may not have the economic or political capital to counter the United States efforts. From the other state’s
perspective this seemingly normal interaction would appear coercive as the state has little power to counter
the United States’ effort.
6

“Memorandum for the National Security Council, Subject: Intelligence Advisory Committee
Comments on the Intelligence Aspects of NSC Action No. 1074-a,” dated April 6, 1954, Security Efforts
Overseas [April 1954—September 1958], Box 10, Subject Series, NSC Series, White House Office, Office
of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, DDEL.
7

A timely question to consider as the United States processes the Mueller Report. While there is
widespread outrage at Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election it would be useful for
Americans to consider how the United States interfered with foreign elections during the Cold War. One is
not better than the other, but perhaps the outrage could be directed to national self-reflection on how the
United States’ pursues relations with other states and what reaction that provokes. The United States
adopted political warfare during Eisenhower’s time in office because they noted the success that the
Soviet’s had in waging political warfare.

5

War’s utility is ultimately a perception based on how a leader or state balances
costs and benefits. This thesis acknowledges the revisionist and post-revisionist views of
Eisenhower’s grand strategy.8 While Eisenhower admittedly sought to avoid war, and its
effects on American society, he also pursued policies that created instability and violence
abroad. In large part then, this thesis shows how war reflects society, and that war often
occurs when society perceives it as useful. Of course, the view of war’s utility—and what
constitutes war—varies by nation. Analyzing Eisenhower’s efforts to prevent nuclear
war, which redirected violence to the Third World through coercive foreign policy,
demonstrates the futility of war and peace as distinct times in an interconnected world.
Understanding the utility of war—perceived and actual—informs policy making, moral
and ethical debates, and ultimately how a nation defines interests in relation to means.
The Jackson Committee, charged with studying political warfare as a means of national
power, stated that, “national security and a just and peaceful world order,” were
unattainable but approachable.9 In 1953 that assessment probably sounded pragmatic, yet
hopeful. Viewed from Eisenhower’s final years in office, though, that uncertain
assessment sounds like the tired view of a man too long at war.

8

Revisionists argue that Eisenhower actively directed American national security policy and
sought to contain communism without triggering nuclear war. Post-revisionists argue that Eisenhower’s
“Waging Peace” narrative neglects the numerous covert operations and coercive foreign policies that
disrupted the emergence of the Third World following the end of colonialism. For an overview of the
historiography of Eisenhower’s presidency see Richard Immerman, “Confessions of an Eisenhower
Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal,” Diplomatic History 14, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 319-342.
9

Document #370, “Report to the President by the President’s Committee on International
Information Activities,” dated June 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, Part 2, National Security Affairs,
1798.

6

Chapter 1 – Ike’s War

Eisenhower’s Grand Strategy: The Great Equation
Grand strategy is difficult to define, hard to observe in practice, and often a title
assigned to a pattern of policies and decisions in hindsight. More often, grand strategy
reflects a dialogue of competing worldviews that ebbs and flows with success and
failure.10 Despite the hazards of developing and implementing grand strategy, it continues
to be associated with the deliberate and calculated use of power to achieve interests.11
Historian Hal Brands offered a useful definition, describing grand strategy as a
“conceptual framework” through which interests are translated into ends and supported
by means.12 Some scholars argue that only large states can craft grand strategy because
they actually possess the means to achieve interests.13 However, if grand strategy is
viewed as conceptual framework then any state, or actor, could develop a grand strategy
despite limited means. Grand strategy can also serve as a blue print that dictates actions

10
For a look at this dimension of grand strategy see the competing views concerning United
States’ grand strategy in the May/June 2019 issue of Foreign Affairs.
11

R.D. Hooker, Jr., The Grand Strategy of the United States, Institute for National Strategic
Studies Monograph, (Washington D.C., October 2014), 1,
https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/grand-strategy-us.pdf (accessed April 4, 2019)
12
Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 3. The
United States military defines grand strategy as “Grand strategy aims to secure and advance a nation’s
long-term, enduring, core interests over time.” Quote taken from “Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy,”
dated April 25, 2018, Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Electronic Library, U.S. Department of Defense,
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf?ver=2018-04-25-150439-540
(accessed April 27, 2019). The website notes that “A joint doctrine note (JDN) is a pre-doctrinal
publication that does not necessarily describe a position of consensus across joint forces.” The main
document guiding joint planners, U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Planning,”
dated June 16, 2017, does not include a definition of grand strategy.
13

Williamson Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strategy,” in The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy,
Diplomacy, and War, eds. Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1.
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or a process to determine an acceptable decision in relation to a state’s environment.14
Because states do not operate in a vacuum, and the interconnected nature of the world
means that decisions are made in a constantly changing context, it is important that grand
strategy is developed through process, if not a process in itself.15 Another way to consider
grand strategy is the ideals or principles guiding a state’s actions. Grand strategy does not
achieve an end, rather, it describes conditions a state wishes to achieve or maintain.
States observe the world and make decisions through the lens of grand strategy.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower arguably possessed a grand strategy for the
United States during his presidency that governed the instruments of national power. The
president identified security and solvency as the two driving factors of American grand
strategy, and he called it the “Great Equation.”16 Eisenhower also believed war lacked
utility in the atomic age. Rather than counter communism through general war, Ike
waged war using diplomatic, economic, and information means to achieve the objectives
of his grand strategy. Another factor informing Eisenhower’s grand strategy was the
belief that communism posed an existential threat to the free world and consequently
America needed to confront communist expansion. These two factors—war’s lack of
utility and the need to confront communism—informed the development of Ike’s foreign

14

Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “What Is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” Texas
National Security Review 2, no. 1 (November 2018), https://tnsr.org/2018/11/what-is-grand-strategysweeping-a-conceptual-minefield/ (accessed April 29, 2019).
15

Tarak Barkawi, Globalization and War (New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2006), 99-101. In this sense, grand strategy is a cultural expression of how society views power, interests,
and violence in its interactions with other people.
16

Immerman and Bowie, Waging Peace, 44. See also Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War:
Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
2006), 53-55.

8

policy along with the Great Equation.17 The Cold War ideology concerning communism
and freedom is so imbedded in popular memory and scholarship that America’s need to
confront communism is taken as fact rather than a choice.18
Grand strategy is different from foreign policy, diplomacy, and military strategy
in that it informs those instruments of state power; it is executed through military,
economic, diplomatic, and other means. The employment of means within the conceptual
framework of grand strategy is how nations govern the specific means of their state
power. For Eisenhower, National Security Council paper 162/2 outlined his defense
policy to support his grand strategy. Known as the “New Look,” NSC 162/2 addressed

17
Given the ideological rhetoric that permeates Cold War political discourse the ability to discern
truth, or rather honest belief, from rhetoric designed to mobilize or contain sentiments becomes critical.
Eisenhower’s presidency, no less his defense policy, has been assessed as purely pragmatic as well as
manipulative. As this thesis analyzes how and why Eisenhower defined war it cannot rely on any one type
of source. Marc Trachtenberg stated, “If you are interested in seeing what a key policy maker was actually
thinking, you do not want to focus too narrowly on just one particular document. You want to see whether
that policy maker said much the same thing in a wide variety of contexts, over a considerable period of
time, and whether particular points were made with real feeling. And you want to see whether the words
corresponded to what was actually done.” Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide
to Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 156. While this thesis focuses on
Eisenhower’s development of NSC 162/2, it analyzes Iran and Guatemala as examples of Eisenhower’s
conceptualization of war’s utility in foreign policy.
18

The term ideology is controversial and as sociologist Clifford Geertz noted, “It is one of the
minor ironies of modern intellectual history that the term “ideology” has itself become thoroughly
ideologized. A concept that once meant but a collection of political proposals perhaps somewhat
intellectualistic and impractical but an any rate idealistic—“social romances” as someone, perhaps
Napoleon, called them—has now become, to quote Webster’s, “the integrated assertions, theories, and aims
constituting a politico-social program, often with an implication of factitious propagandizing; as, Fascism
was altered in Germany to fit the Nazi ideology”—a much more formidable proposition.” Geertz also made
an important point regarding ideology that deserves attention before discussing the role of beliefs in
Eisenhower’s policy and American society during the 1950s. Geertz argued that, “The quality of social
rhetoric in ideology is thus not proof that the vision of sociopsychological reality upon which it is based is
false and that it draws its persuasive power from any discrepancy between what is believed and what can,
now or someday, be established as scientifically correct. That it may indeed lose touch with reality in an
orgy of autistic fantasy—even that, in situations where it is left uncriticized by either a free science or
competing ideologies well-rooted in the general social structure, it has a very strong tendency to do so—is
all too apparent.” For more information on ideology and culture see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretations of
Cultures (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2017), 211 and 250.

9

one aspect of American grand strategy that consumed the latter half of the twentieth
century—containing the Soviet Union.19
Eisenhower’s life prepared him for crafting a comprehensive grand strategy and
understanding the relationship between interests, ends, and means.20 Before the Second
World War, Eisenhower benefited from the mentorship of Generals Fox Connor, John
Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, and George Marshall. While all four generals assisted

19

There are two main strategies associated with Eisenhower’s presidency: the New Look and the
Eisenhower Doctrine. While the term Eisenhower Doctrine is unequivocally linked to Eisenhower’s Middle
East policy established in 1957, the New Look is used loosely and represents competing ideas about
Eisenhower’s grand strategy. First, some historians argue that the New Look emerged in the 1952
presidential campaign. Others argue that the New Look was Eisenhower’s view of American priorities,
more accurately stated as the Great Equation. Still other historians claim that New Look emphasized
Mutually Assured Destruction as Eisenhower’s strategy though this emphasis on nuclear deterrence did not
emerge until 1956-57. Eisenhower best expressed his view of the New Look and military forces in a press
conference on 23 May 1956. While responding to questions he stated that the New Look entailed an
examination of the role and organization of the armed forces to meet. He also reiterated that security did
not come from military means alone but “the combined whole strength of America.” He also refuted claims
that massive retaliation served as a new strategy in American defense policy. Eisenhower stated that, “the
sole use of Armed Forces, so far as war between two great countries possessing atom and hydrogen bombs
today is this: their deterrent value.” Nuclear weapons played a role in the grand strategy of the United
States, but the feasibility of nuclear war never advanced past deterring war in Eisenhower’s mind.
Historian Michael J. Hogan provided a concise summary of the New Look while also relating it to
previous American administrations. Hogan argued that, “This strategy, which aimed to control costs and
limit the need for military manpower and troops stationed abroad, began to emerge in the early years of the
Truman administration, gave way temporarily during the Korean War, and then reemerged as the so-called
New Look in the 1950s. Indeed, the Eisenhower administration, as the debates over the New Look point
out, would wrestle with the same problems of institution building and budget making as its predecessor,
reach some of the same compromises, and thus consolidate a pattern of state making and military strategy
that had been taking shape since the end of World War II.” In “Introduction: The National Security
Discourse of the Early Cold War and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman,” in Origins of the National Security
State and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman, ed. Mary Ann Heiss and Michael J. Hogan (Kirksville, Missouri:
Truman State University Press, 2015), 6. NSC 162/2 became known as the New Look: after Joint Chief of
Staff Admiral Arthur Radford and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles referred to it by that name in
public speeches. NSC 162/2 can be accessed in Document #101, FRUS, National Security Affairs, Volume
II, Part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101.
20

Many historians have noted Eisenhower’s military background as key to understanding his
actions as president. For an analysis focused on Eisenhower’s use of rhetoric see Ira Chernus, General
Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2002); For an
intimate look at Eisenhower’s relationship with General Fox Connor see Steven Rabalais, General Fox
Connor: Pershing’s Chief of Operations and Eisenhower’s Mentor (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers,
2016); For an analysis of Eisenhower’s military and presidential career that provides a personal view of Ike
see Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower: In War and Peace (New York, NY: Random House Trade
Paperbacks, 2013); For a policy and diplomatic history of Eisenhower’s national security system see Bowie
and Immerman, Waging Peace.
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Ike’s career through personal advocacy and finding positions that benefited Eisenhower,
they also provided him perspective on war, politics, and grand strategy.21 Best known for
making Eisenhower read Carl von Clausewitz’s On War three times, Connor taught Ike
the benefit of studying history and the particulars of working with allied armies.22
Eisenhower’s assignment with General Pershing in the American Battle Monuments
Commission culminated with Ike writing A Guide to the American Battle Fields in
Europe. The research and analysis required to write the guide, combined with Ike
walking the battlefields in France, provided him an understanding of World War I and the
consequences of strategic decisions. This experience also directed his attention to the
issue of preparedness and mobilization. Eisenhower wrote his U.S. Army War College
research paper on how to prepare the American military for future conflict.23 In the years
prior to World War II, Eisenhower served in the War Department and in the Philippines
under the guidance of MacArthur and Marshall, furthering his exposure to grand strategy
and politics.24
Eisenhower’s service in the Second World War leading the War Department’s
War Plans Division, commander of Operation Torch, and Supreme Allied Commander
taught him the promise and limits of military power, the importance of political

21

The best overview of Eisenhower’s relationship with his mentors can be found in Smith,
Eisenhower: In War and Peace. See chapter three for his relationship with Connor; chapter four for
Pershing’s influence; chapter five and six for MacArthur and Eisenhower’s service in Washington D.C. and
the Philippines; see chapter eight for Eisenhower’s service with Marshall. For a shorter synopsis see
Immerman and Bowie, Waging Peace, 41-43.
22

Rabalais, General Fox Connor, 183.

23

Smith, Eisenhower, 81.

24

Ibid., 141-144. See also, Immerman and Bowie, Waging Peace, 41-43.

11

objectives in relation to military objectives, and the devastating effects of war.25 Working
closely with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
allied politicians and military members impressed upon Ike that military objectives
served a policy objective.26 His first combat assignment to command the invasion of
North Africa emerged from the debate between the United States, Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union about where, when, and how to open a second front against the Axis
powers. Ike’s service in the military, and close interaction with politicians, allowed him
to develop and refine a keen appreciation for the use of rhetoric in strategic
communication, a key aspect of a grand strategy that relied on information and
psychological warfare.27 Despite Eisenhower’s extensive experience crafting military
strategy and working with international leaders during the war, Ike implemented rather
than crafted grand strategy.
The course of international affairs from 1945 to 1952 further refined
Eisenhower’s understanding of America’s role in the world and the feasibility of means
and ends. President Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945 marked a change in international relations and the magnitude of what some
deemed as “total war.”28 When the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in 1948,
fears of nuclear war increased, in part because of lingering disagreement over wartime

25

Immerman and Bowie, Waging Peace, 41-43.

26

Ibid., 42. See Smith, Eisenhower, 208-213 for a discussion of the debate over Operation
TORCH and President Roosevelt’s assertion of authority as commander in chief.
27

Chernus, General Eisenhower, 2.

28

For a discussion differing views of war in the nuclear age see, Michael Carver, “Conventional
War in the Nuclear Age,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age eds. Peter
Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

12

treaties to subdue Germany and rebuild Europe.29 Fears that the Soviet Union had
directed North Korea’s 1950 attack on South Korea seemed to validate the idea of a
monolithic communist organization spreading across the globe.30 Truman already had
established the European Relief Program (ERP), popularly known as the Marshall Plan,
and spurred the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to rebuild
Western Europe and buttress it against the fear of Soviet aggression.31
Though supportive of rebuilding Europe and serving as NATO’s first Supreme
Commander, Eisenhower grew concerned about the consequences of Truman policies.
Comparing Truman to “a fine man, who, in the middle of a stormy lake, knows nothing
of swimming,” Eisenhower lamented “if his wisdom could only equal his good intent.”
Ike viewed Truman’s policy making process as chaotic and reactive while also expending
American resources without considering the likely duration of the Cold War.32 For
Eisenhower, international events after 1945 reinforced his belief that America’s fate was
inseparable from the new world order. America’s military, economic, and “spiritual”
might necessitated action in preserving that new, and ever-changing world.
Domestic factors also weighed heavily on Eisenhower’s mind as he identified
American interests and acceptable means for maintaining those interests. Approached by
both the Democratic and Republican party as a presidential candidate, Eisenhower
decided to run as a Republican. Eisenhower supported parts of New Deal social welfare,
29
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but he also wanted to slow the continuing shift to leftist policies sponsored by the
Democratic party. Likewise, he also feared what would happen to the United States and
the world order if Republicans led by Senator Robert Taft gained power and carried out
their isolationist views. Eisenhower saw himself as the candidate of the “Middle Way.”33
While vowing during his presidential campaign to end the Korean War, he also argued
for American involvement in the world to counter communist expansion. Ike wrote to a
childhood friend that “The one indispensable thing to remember is that, if the free world
cannot provide for its ‘collective’ security, the alternative for every one of these nations,
including our own, is an eventual fate that is worse than any kind of expense or effort we
can now imagine.”34 While the American home-front had been separated physically from
the battlefields of the world wars, Eisenhower believed that the Cold War could impact
America at home. The desire to balance domestic policies and maintain a firm
commitment to America’s allies arguably influenced the new president as much as
foreign affairs.35
Eisenhower’s decision to run for president as a Republican against Senator Robert
Taft revealed his domestic and foreign outlook: America could not retreat into
isolationism, nor could it sustain continued growth of social welfare programs and an
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increasingly large defense budget. The American economy required access to natural
resources in strategic areas across the globe. This necessitated trade agreements with
friendly nations, something that Eisenhower and many policymakers perceived as under
attack due to communist expansion.36 Likewise, the growing defense budget, thanks to
the Korean War and the United States’ economic aid to allies in Europe, continued to
swell because of perceived communist expansion and the Truman Doctrine’s promise to
assist free nations anywhere.37
In short, Eisenhower wanted to reduce the tension between solvency and security.
He believed “that the overwhelming majority of the people of the free world appreciate
the fact that a healthy American economy and a functioning economy in their own home
country are inseparable from true defense.”38 Solvency also served as a deterrent to war
and its destructive effect on American society. Eisenhower noted to Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles that, “if the contest to maintain this relative position [of nuclear
power] should have to continue indefinitely, the cost would either drive use to war—or
into some form of dictatorial government. In such circumstances, we would be forced to
considered whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war.
”39 Insolvency threatened not only domestic economic health, but the American public’s
attitude toward war’s utility. While the Great Equation seemed obvious to Eisenhower, he
36
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noted that “we must have the enlightened support of Americans” to justify defense
spending without driving Americans to believe war provided a faster path to economic
stability and prosperity.40
Though Eisenhower distanced himself from Truman’s version of containment that
he believed overextended American interests and means, by 1952 Truman’s
administration also understood and grappled with the tension between security, solvency,
and the need for a long-term policy. To that end, and anticipating the presidential
transition, President Truman directed a reappraisal of NSC-68 in 1952. A memorandum
from Counselor of the Department of State Charles E. Bohlen to the Director of the
Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, detailing initial conclusions from the drafting group’s
analysis indicates that Truman’s policy staff had already developed views that are largely
attributed to Eisenhower in his New Look. After reviewing updated estimates of Soviet
atomic capabilities, the drafting group concluded that American national security strategy
designed to counter the Soviet threat was sound and should be continued “without feeling
the compulsion of achieving them by a certain date.”41 In 1952, draft policy statements
reveal that policy planners no longer believed in a date of maximum danger as described
in NSC 68. The planners returned to the conclusion of NSC 20/1—drafted in 1948—that,
“We are faced here with no rigid periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to
conclude that we must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date.”42 As Truman’s
presidency came to a close, his staff argued that general war would inevitably escalate to
40
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nuclear war. Due to the threat of nuclear war—and its attendant destruction—the utility
of general war as a means to deter Soviet expansion became “less rewarding.” However,
the acceptance of NSC 141 on 13 January 1953 as the final reappraisal of NSC 68
reaffirmed the assumptions that informed the development of NSC 68. Though Truman
did not accept the drafting group’s conclusions in the final document, it is clear that key
elements of Eisenhower’s New Look were already present in the national security
documents circulating and informing administration decision making.43
Eisenhower’s experience in international affairs provided him the opportunity to
identify the nature and characteristics of the conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union. By his inauguration in 1953, Eisenhower had spent over ten years at the
highest levels of military command where military strategy connects to policy and
American grand strategy. Eisenhower understood the Cold War as a challenge to
America’s way of life. Economic prosperity, physical survival, global cooperation, and
America’s ability to shape its future became uncertain as the world grappled to
understand the Soviet Union’s intentions. Many wondered if democratic capitalism could
peacefully coexist with communism. Both ideologies expressed the same goals of
security and prosperity, yet the methods used to achieve the ends clearly were different.
Such ideological tension created fear, suspicion, and uncertainty. The Cold War became a
multi-faceted conflict to ensure American hegemony based on protecting the global free
world. War represented military force, covert action, psychological warfare, and
economic policy. Communism, the Soviet Union, communist China, and satellite states
43
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became the enemy. Peace was not an option so long as the ideological war remained.
Victory could not be guaranteed by action, but by the inevitable failure of a corrupt
system.44 Survival only could be guaranteed by action. War was a state of contest
between democracy and communism, yet Eisenhower worried about war’s
destructiveness, and he cautiously balanced countering communism with preserving
American values and ideas.

Eisenhower’s Understanding of the Cold War
Without question, the Cold War context influenced how Eisenhower identified
and prioritized interests, threats, means, and ends. Addressing the press shortly after his
inauguration, Ike noted that “A true posture of defense is composed of three factors-spiritual, military, and economic.”45 Like Truman, Eisenhower did not support
preventative war or isolationism.46 He noted the tension felt by many Americans in his
diary, writing that, “I’d like to see the United States able to sit at home and ignore the rest
of the world. What a pleasing prospect, until you look at ultimate consequences,
destruction.” McGeorge Bundy, best known for his service as Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson’s National Security Advisor, noted in 1952 that Eisenhower’s election
represented three truths of the Cold War. First, that the United States had to stand up
against an expansionist Soviet Union. Second, that “the United States must not try to go it
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alone.” And finally, that Eisenhower represented America because “he was at heart a man
of peace.”47 Eisenhower viewed the Cold War as more than a new modus vivendi for
foreign relations in a world marked by nuclear weapons, decolonization, and the postwar
world order–it also defined American interests and identity. Always the soldier, Ike
believed his presidential campaign was a call to duty on behalf of the American public,
and he promoted a similar call to duty to American citizens. By responding to the threats
presented by communism and the Soviet Union the American people became defenders
of freedom and prosperity.48
The interests of the United States during the Cold War reflected the multi-faceted
nature of the conflict.49 American and Soviet views of the world collided in ideological,
economic, moral, and global spaces. Fears of communism that the war had moderated, or
forced out of public discourse, resurfaced as Americans watched the Soviet Union exert
greater control over Eastern Europe. European states rebuilt after the war and reestablished domestic political systems, exposing the influence of communism behind the
Iron Curtain. While a vulnerable Europe loomed in the minds of U.S. policy makers, a
majority of Americans also feared the prospect of another economic depression after the
Second World War. Moreover, the morality, and political feasibility, of colonialism and
imperialism came into question as European powers lost their ability to retain colonial
possessions as nationalism grew in the Third World. Global economic, political, and
47
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social movements thus collided with American and Soviet actions. The superpower
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union occurred in an already
diverse and interconnected world.
The Cold War was an ideological conflict waged in America and across the globe.
Ira Chernus noted that ideology played a central role in the Cold War.50 The ideological
conflict occurred domestically and internationally. Like previous wars, the Cold War
influenced American national identity and it continues to impact the United States
today.51 Eisenhower used the conflict to shape American society in the continuing debate
over the role of the federal government and the relation of the individual to society. Ike
viewed extremists in both the Democrat and Republican parties as dangerous to national
unity. Image and prestige mattered in the Cold War. Language influenced the perception
of action, even similar acts by countries ideologically opposed.
For example, in a memorandum to the National Security Council, the Intelligence
Advisory Committee proposed “substituting the word ‘participation’ for ‘intervention’
throughout the paper wherever reference is made to US action as opposed to Chinese
communist action.”52 Yet, as the memorandum and supporting annexes suggest, while
intervention—in this case, in Indochina—would focus on destroying Vietminh forces,
there was potential that “once U.S. forces and prestige have been committed,
50
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disengagement will not be possible short of victory.”53 Ideology affected the domestic
and international affairs of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The leaders of
each nation had to justify domestic policies while also balancing public support and fiscal
resources for international agendas.
The Cold War developed into an economic competition to prove the viability of
political systems and to ensure the survival of the allied coalitions. Economic ideology
also drove the perception of economic strength. Eisenhower believed that if states turned
to communism, the United States would inevitably lose access to resources and
markets.54 A Bureau of Economic Affairs study on foreign economic relations explained
the importance of economic relations to American foreign policy during the Cold War.
“The basic aim of our foreign policy is to improve the security and well-being of the US.
This objective is generally accepted and understood. What is less widely appreciated is
the fact that our international economic policies are a major instrument for achieving this
objective. In fact, unless we can regain and step up the initiative in the foreign economic
field, US leadership in the free world is threatened.”55 Economic relations improved
security by guaranteeing access to strategic resources required to wage “modern war.”56
Dulles confirmed the importance of this economic competition to the Cold War.
“I have become personally convinced that it is going to be very difficult to stop
communism in much of the world if we cannot in some way duplicate the intensive
53
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Communist effort to raise productive standards…That is one reason Communism has
such great appeal where the slogans of ‘liberty’, ‘freedom’, and ‘personal dignity’ have
little appeal.”57 The ideological values and norms of democratic capitalism needed to
bring palpable benefits to rising nations. Likewise, preventing the success of communist
movements became a focal point for the Eisenhower administration. Economic
prosperity, centered on international trade, influenced Eisenhower’s approach to the
conflict between capitalism and communism. The Cold War became a competition to
prove the universal application of their capitalist and communist ideologies.58 Because
Eisenhower tied economic prosperity to national survival, his administration equated
economic expansion and growth with security and successful foreign policy.
The Cold War also represented a moral conflict between good and evil, driven
largely by the need to build domestic support of defense spending. John Foster Dulles’s
staunch belief in the moral nature of the Cold War is well known, and at times caused the
public to doubt if Eisenhower had control over his secretary of state.59 Speaking to the
1953 graduating class at the National War College in Washington, D.C., Dulles argued
that “Where, however, there are many who do not accept moral principles, then that
creates the need to protect those who do.” His speech defined the coalition of free nations
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as those who “wish to live by the moral law” as opposed to communists who “believe in
enforced conformity to a materialistic standard.”60
Historian Ira Chernus has argued that “Eisenhower’s ideology constructed human
life as an eternal struggle between two basic elements of human nature: the universal
impulse to selfishness and the countervailing impulse to control our own innate
selfishness. For Eisenhower, this struggle was a religious struggle and the essence of
what many religions are really about.”61 Eisenhower’s statement to the American Legion
in February 1953 reflects the moral and religious language that Chernus noted. In his
statement on the American Legion’s “Back to God Program,” Eisenhower told the
audience that “we know that the blessings that we are really thankful for are a different
type. They are what our forefathers called our rights-our human rights. One reason that
we cherish these rights so sincerely is because they are God-given. They belong to the
people who have been created in His image.”62 Morality did not direct grand strategy—
the extreme moralist that Chernus portrays Eisenhower as would have encouraged the
nation to accept hardship over encroaching on other nations to achieve economic
prosperity—but it did influence the language of the Cold War.63
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Strong regional and hemispheric alliances and considerations also influenced the
nature of the Cold War. Western Europe remained the critical point of American and
Soviet military confrontation due to the postwar location of military forces and the
importance of European resources and industry. Many scholars contend that the origin of
the Cold War was the disagreement over the partition of Germany, and Germany’s role in
the postwar world did exert influence on foreign policy decisions throughout the Cold
War.64 While popular narratives of the Cold War portray the Third World and nations on
the periphery as gaining importance due to the struggle between capitalism and
communism, a cursory examination of American history shows that the Cold War merely
intensified the scope of American interests—and intervention—in periphery nations.65
The advantage of retaining key geography for staging military forces or for maintaining
control of raw materials required for war mobilization gave value to countries and
peoples with no direct relationship with the United States.66
Solvency required growth especially with domestic fears of another depression
and the loss of markets to communist expansion.67 Six months into his presidency,
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Eisenhower noted in his diary that “One thing that the long-term good of each of us
demands is the fiscal, economic, industrial, and agricultural soundness of America.”68
American solvency supported and relied on trade with the free world. President Truman
had wielded America’s economic might to stabilize and rebuild Europe through the
Marshall Plan, and Ike had similar intentions but different means to achieve stability. To
maintain economic dominance and to support the coalition of free countries, America had
to maintain economic growth and a strong free world economy. Myron C. Cowen, the
American ambassador to Belgium, noted that “It is one of the major parts of the great
problem before the nations of the free world—the creation of an effective and integrated
economy on this side of the Iron Curtain. It is the common awareness of this problem,
both in Europe and in the United States, that has been responsible for the wide acceptance
of such phrases as ‘trade, not aid.’”69 Economic aid might support allies but it could
equally drain American wealth without a return on the investment. Burton Kaufman has
argued that Eisenhower “was committed, like most other U.S. government leaders, to a
foreign economic program of eliminating foreign aid and relying instead on liberalized
world trade and the encouragement of private foreign investment to assure world
economic growth and prosperity.”70 Promoting trade over aid benefited both America and
its allies because it promised to create economic growth for all parties.71
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Internal considerations and history drove both the American and Soviet
development of interests. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both
struggled on the home-front to achieve the stability and mobilization needed to achieve
victory in the world order. The home-front became another arena where the United States
and Soviet Union both attempted to win the Cold War by creating ideal societies based
on their respective economic ideologies.72 The United States used fear of communism to
suppress dissent and prevent unrest, thereby eliminating communist influence in
society.73 The Soviet Union created a closed society and directed its population to focus
internally on achieving the dream of communism.74
Without question, American leaders were concerned about the potential domestic
instability in the aftermath of the Second World War. Both the population and
policymakers feared another economic depression, the lingering effects of women’s
wartime social emancipation, and the reintegration of millions of demobilized
servicemen.75 Memories of the Great Depression and the dislocations caused by war
encouraged many Americans to embrace the image of a stable family life as the
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American ideal.76 Depression and war had delayed gratification and people yearned for a
more prosperous life. Despite wartime production requiring a sixty percent increase in
working women, the fear of women taking jobs from returning servicemen stifled support
for a permanent shift in gender roles.77 This uncertainty of reintegrating servicemen
revolved around behavioral concerns. Leaders worried how war-effected men would
resume roles in society, especially as husbands and fathers.78 In the midst of these
uncertainties, government leaders confronted the spreading influence of communism.
Such concerns led American leaders to fear that any instability could be manipulated by
communists to gain a foothold in American society. The Communist Party of the United
States of America (CPUSA) already had increased support due to the economic hardship
of the depression, and the racial and class inequality present in Jim Crow America.79
While the CPUSA remained small, the spy trials of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the fall
of China to communism, and the Korean War all exacerbated fears that every subversive
posed a threat.80
Security against such threats required military strength and capacity to defend the
nation and its interests, and not just according to American leaders. While the United
States had expanded its power in the 1940s, the destruction of the Second World War
presented visible reminders to Soviet citizens. Likewise, the Soviet Union entered the
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Cold War with similar experiences but with different memories. No Soviet leader could
ignore the fact that the Second World War consumed one-third of the Soviet Union’s
national wealth and resulted in twenty-seven million soldiers and civilians killed.81 Due
to the emotional and psychological impact of the Second World War in Soviet society,
the cult of Stalin strengthened as he positioned himself as the hero of the Great Patriotic
War through official propaganda and parades in his honor.82 The Great Patriotic War
defined a generation and their pride in victory enabled them to overlook the darker side
of Stalin’s form of communism, namely the political purges and hardships of the 1930s.
Stalin capitalized on the Soviet population’s pride in victory, celebrating their sacrifice
and urging citizens to delay gratification a while longer to rebuild the country.83 Within
Soviet society, the desire to achieve peace and prosperity conflicted with the need to
“catch up to America” and achieve the goal of communism.84
In their own framing of the Cold War, the United States government attempted to
prevent social instability and mobilize the home-front against communism by enlarging
the fear about the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, the societal ills of sexually liberated
women and homosexuals, and linking traditional family norms to future prosperity.
Whereas nuclear war created uncertainty in society, the government hoped that “the
modern family would tame fears of atomic holocaust and tame women as well.”85 In this
formulation, families that embraced traditional roles of men as breadwinners, women as
81
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nurturing mothers, and children as obedient and studious would prevent communism
from infecting American society. Businesses advertised modern appliances and other
consumer goods to promote convenience and persuade women to embrace domesticity as
their profession. Traditional family norms would also serve to contain women’s sexuality
and prevent ‘subversive’ behavior like homosexuality which would erode social values
and present a way for communists to disrupt American society. To some extent,
Americans shared these goals. Historian Elaine May has noted that “Like their leaders,
most Americans agreed that family stability appeared to be the best bulwark against the
dangers of the Cold War.” The desire for a stable and prosperous family life reflected the
pre-Cold War influences.86 Government propaganda during the Second World War had
encouraged men to fight for a girl waiting for them at home or to protect the ‘American
way of life”, and that message continued into the Cold War.87 The Great Depression and
a world war had disrupted family life for many men and women, and the government
capitalized on the longing for a stable family to contain any social instability that might
provide an opening for communism to take root.
Meanwhile, Stalin waged an anti-cosmopolitan war at home. Stalin had eased
coercive policies toward Soviet society during the Great Patriotic War to win over the
United States and Great Britain, but after the war he targeted the intelligentsia and any
publication not heralding the superiority of the Soviet system. The Soviet family became
a tool in Stalin’s campaign to rebuild the Soviet economy and industry.88 Unlike the early
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Cold War American family which had begun to move to the suburbs, the Soviet family
lived in multi-generational housing. Privacy concerns prevented families from discussing
state policies out of fear that neighbors would spy on them. This prevented the spread of
dissent about the poor living conditions and lack of consumer goods. Children born after
the war did not understand how a lack of food meant progress towards full communism,
whereas the parents and grandparents who survived Stalin’s purges and the war reflected
that they were better off than during the war.89 The fear of Stalin’s wrath and the memory
of the Great Patriotic War suppressed dissent.
Stalin also compared American and Soviet societies to highlight the gender
equality benefits of communism. Whereas American society encouraged women to stay
home, Soviet women worked and enjoyed the same status as men. Soviet women
primarily worked because rebuilding the Soviet economy required full mobilization and
the war had created a significant male-female imbalance.90 The same realities allowed the
Soviet Union to claim greater gender equality in higher education where more women
than men graduated college.91 Though communism appeared more socially liberating, the
Soviet system still embraced traditional family norms. Laws restricting abortion and
divorce forced women to remain in unfulfilling marriages. Insufficient state day care
facilities also meant that mothers faced the unequal task of balancing work and raising
children, though the multigenerational family housing allowed grandparents to raise
children.92
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Thus, both nations developed interests based on insecurities and perceived
threats, rather than on a grand design for democratic capitalism or communism. However,
the ideology of democratic capitalism and communism created and gave meaning to
threats and interests. For the Soviet Union the insecurity stemmed from a history of
conflict and devastation. Soviet fears of the state collapsing after the Second World War
because of internal turmoil only heightened insecurities. For the United States, insecurity
grew from its new role in the world order. Though America possessed the atomic bomb, a
global defense network, and an untouched home-front it realized “that the price of
preeminence is vulnerability.”93 No state is—or feels—immune from socio-economic
crisis, and the Soviet Union and the United States both prioritized their own state survival
over wantonly dominating ideology. Each state feared the other’s intentions because of
differences in ideologies, yet both states chose not to attack the other because ideological
conflict threatened the state—and therefore its ideology. Ideology prevented conflict
while also increasing tension. Maintaining control over their respective domestic political
systems remained the basic requirement for survival.94 National unity, always at risk of
decay in the aftermath of war or during times of change, required a force to give it
meaning.95
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Evaluating Threats: America, Communism, and the Soviet Union
The emergence of a strong Soviet Union and the belief in monolithic communism
drove American interests. Policy makers in Truman and Eisenhower’s administrations
admitted they lacked adequate intelligence about Soviet intentions. The Net Assessments
referenced in National Security Council meetings and planning documents reveal the
vague and incomplete understanding of the Soviet Union’s capabilities. Yet, the
intentions and desires are boldly stated. The available intelligence that Eisenhower and
his administration used to make policy was insufficient in understanding the Soviet
Union’s true capacity and did not consider the effect of the Second World War’s
destruction in the Soviet mindset.96 Dulles noted that C.D. Jackson felt “the CIA was
exercising an excessive role in relation to policy-making” instead of its primary
responsibility to “provide the facts” that should inform policy makers.97 It is difficult for
policy-makers to balance bias and perspective when formulating national security policy;
relying on intelligence that favors a specific policy approach only complicates the
process. The potential skewing of intelligence added to the intelligence deficiency
Eisenhower inherited from the Truman administration—the inability to gauge Soviet
intentions.
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Even as Eisenhower’s New Look policy reached its final form in October 1953,
Ike’s planning staff recommended developing net assessments concerning “political,
economic, and military capabilities” of the Soviet Union. It is quixotic—and flawed—to
expect complete and accurate intelligence. However, the lack of assessments focusing on
intentions and socio-political factors in the Soviet Union questions how different
Eisenhower’s New Look was from Truman’s understanding of the Cold War. An
assessment of the Foreign Intelligence Program included in NSC 161 provides a sobering
look at how well the United States could measure Soviet intentions as it considered how
to confront and contain communism. “Conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist
intentions to initiate hostilities at any given time must be tentative generalizations drawn
from inadequate evidence.”98
Despite this bleak assessment by American intelligence, American government
officials had drawn their own conclusions. George Kennan, a key figure throughout the
Cold War but especially in the Truman administration, provided the most detailed
information on Soviet intentions and beliefs. While many Americans believed that the
Soviet Union would seek to expand communism across the globe no matter the cost,
Kennan believed that the Soviets wanted to avoid any confrontation with the United
States, especially a military one.99 More importantly, Kennan believed that “atomic
bombs and other weapons of mass destruction were useful only for destroying an
adversary, not for changing his attitudes.”100 Eisenhower and Kennan shared similar
98
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beliefs about war and its role in defeating communism. When Ike convened Project
Solarium to examine possible approaches to containing the Soviet Union, Kennan served
as the leader of Task Force A. The president noted Kennan’s impressive grasp of the
world situation after receiving a presentation of Project Solarium’s conclusions on 16
July 1953.101
Despite Kennan’s information, US intelligence continued to focus on Soviet
capabilities, not intentions. As John Lewis Gaddis has noted, this “quantitative fallacy”—
what can be counted counts most—led to capabilities indicating, even replacing,
intentions.102 Faced with an inability to truly understand Soviet intentions, policy makers
could only observe the growth of Soviet capabilities. Even an accurate understanding of
capabilities presented challenges as the bomber and missile gap controversies of
Eisenhower’s presidency demonstrate. Though there were military and civilian leaders
who realized Soviet actions often reflected a reaction to American power, those views
had no effect on the final policy positions that documented Soviet intentions.103 More
commonly, American policy makers reflected Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell
Smith’s opinion that,
The root of the paradox lies in the Soviet obsession with the power factor.
Because of this obsession we're compelled to create strength of our own as
a counterweight to the strength of the Soviet Union. Even though we reject
force as an instrument in our relationship with other nations, we’ve
learned through bitter experience that Soviet intransigence reaches a peak
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when the negotiator across the table lacks power. On the other hand,
we’ve learned that it’s possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union if our
negotiating position has solid strength behind it.104
Even though the United States sought a political negotiation to the Cold War, based on
the decline of the Soviet Union, that negotiation would require a strong military deterrent.
No matter the intentions of the Soviet Union, American leaders believed that resolving
the Cold War conflict required strength.
Throughout 1953, National Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Union did not
change significantly and focused on capabilities, even though Stalin’s death presented the
possibility of changing Soviet intentions. While the military and intelligence
communities equated Soviet capabilities with intentions, Eisenhower signaled that he
understood the difference. At an April 1953 press conference, James R. Shepley of Time
magazine asked the president if he believed in the year of maximum danger. This concept
originated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their belief that the Soviet Union would be
able to strike the United States with an atomic bomb by 1954. “I am not going to quarrel
with [the JCS] estimate on when [the Soviets] will have atomic bombs,” Eisenhower
responded. “But I do not admit that anyone can predict when, if ever, another government
would want to launch global war. I just don’t believe there is a necessary relationship
between those two concepts.”105 Despite these views, the language of national security
studies and memoranda continued to focus on Soviet capabilities.

104

Walter Bedell Smith, “Practicalities of Power,” dated May 11, 1953, U.S. Department of State,
Department of State Bulletin 28, no. 724: 676.
105

Dwight D. Eisenhower, dated April 30, 1953, The President's News Conference Online by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/231701 (accessed April 29, 2019).

35

Moreover, competition over resources required for economic growth and strategic
war stocks illustrated how American insecurity formed the perspective of Soviet actions.
The ideological struggle between capitalism and communism morphed into a geographic
contest as each nation sought to retain access to natural resources. Eisenhower’s
economic policy advocated that the United States needed “to develop and insure, in
conjunction with its allies, resources which will provide an adequate supply of petroleum
products to meet the combined requirements of the United States and its allies in a future
major war.”106 The presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran after the Second World
War and the rising influence of the communist Tudeh party there heightened American
fears that the Soviet Union would soon have access to one of the West’s strategic oil
reserves. In fact, George Kennan based his concept of containment on the contest to
maintain control over five strategic areas and, thus, the problems of competition and
insecurity became ingrained in Cold War thinking.107 Though National Intelligence
Estimates noted that the Soviet Union was “unlikely to risk general war,” the thought of
an enemy possessing a military advantage led to an increase in American defense
development and procurement. Early in Eisenhower’s administration the fear of how an
aging fuel tanker fleet would survive in a future war led to debates in multiple NSC
meetings about acquiring faster tankers. Prudent as it may have been, when does planning
for a future war reach diminishing returns for society?
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Without a doubt, raw materials and economic growth were key American
interests, and the communist ability to threaten those interests through rising nationalism
and anti-colonial movements led to an overestimation of Soviet intentions. By partially
viewing the Cold War as an economic competition to validate economic systems,
Eisenhower conflated Soviet economic expansion with Soviet aggression. While Ike
would justify American involvement in regions surrounding the Soviet Union based on
economic interest, similar involvement by the Soviet Union seemed to threaten the global
free world. This reflected the zero-sum nature of the Cold War. Though Americans
wanted peace to maintain stability and economic prosperity, many remained skeptical if
peaceful coexistence truly was possible. Competition for economic growth and
dominance appeared as an existential threat because American identity and survival
rested on economic prosperity. Yet, no serious debate can be found in National Security
Meetings or other public statements about how prosperity should be defined or measured.
Like security, prosperity represented a vague ideal that had the ability to intensify events
and actions beyond reasonable concern.
The rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the anti-communist movement in the
United States also served as a threat to American interests because it endangered the
middle-road approach that Eisenhower hoped to restore to domestic politics. Eisenhower
privately condemned Senator McCarthy’s extremist approach to communism but could ill
afford to take a public stance that appeared soft on communism or absolved Truman of
any responsibility for ‘losing’ China.108 Domestic opinion focused on potential
communist subversion in the United States and government officials “increasingly came
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to view domestic Communism as part of a worldwide Soviet conspiracy.”109 With
McCarthy and his followers denouncing anyone who questioned the United States
approach to containment, it led to a polarization of ideas.110 Though Eisenhower believed
communism to be flawed, in his memoir of World War II, Crusade in Europe, he noted
the need for cooperation and peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.111 By the time
Ike entered the White House, that opinion had become politically indefensible. At best,
Eisenhower sought to maintain enough concern about communism without promoting the
divisive discourse that characterized McCarthy’s effect on society.
The Korean War also validated the belief that the Soviet Union directed
international communism, despite the fact that Eisenhower and key administration
officials identified the divide between the Soviet Union and communist China.
Eisenhower’s criticism of Truman’s failure in China and his subsequent handling of the
Korea War during the 1952 presidential campaign required Ike to take a firm stand
against communist encroachment.112 In his study of how American society developed the
image of the communist enemy during the Cold War, Ron Robin has argued that the
Korean War “hastened the creation of the national security state [and] strengthened
existing images of the enemy.”113 The fall of China to communist forces, followed

109
Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1998), 155.
110

Ibid., 368-371. See also, Ellen Schrecker, The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with
Documents (New York, NY: Bedford / St. Martin’s, 2002), 104-105.
111

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 476. “The
lessons of 1914 and 1939 remain valid so long as the world has not learned the futility of making
competitive force the final arbiter of human questions.”
112

Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, 4.

113

Rob Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

2001), 8.

38

shortly by the Korean War, confirmed the idea that the Soviet Union directed all
communist expansion.
American public opinion both enabled Eisenhower to construct his grand strategy
while also requiring him to enlarge the nature of the conflict and the potential
consequences. While Eisenhower has been construed by some as a manipulative
politician who created fears of an “apocalypse,” the consistency between his public and
private statements makes such analyses unbalanced.114 In fact, Eisenhower’s
administration struggled with creating a narrative for the American public despite Ike’s
simple Great Equation. A report analyzing a grass roots poll completed in the summer of
1953 noted the need for “a deliberate public relations campaign.”115 Eisenhower noted
the issue again in a memorandum to Dulles in September 1953. Ike argued that
“programs for informing American public, as well as other populations, are indispensable
if we are able to do anything except to drift aimlessly, probably to our own eventual
destruction.”116 The process of developing a strategy focused on more than its feasibility
in containing communism. As Eisenhower wrote as he listened to the Project Solarium
briefing, any policy “requires above all--public opinion at home [and] abroad.”117 To
obtain the required public support—“at home and abroad”—Eisenhower presented his
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famous “Atoms for Peace” speech at the United Nations in December 1953.118 Ike and
his administration hoped to calm the fears of Europeans who saw themselves caught in
the middle of a potential nuclear war between the two superpowers. Conversely, the
president wanted to maintain the American public’s awareness of the threat posed by the
Soviet Union and the possibility of nuclear weapons.119
While the Truman administration had viewed general war as a potential means to
achieve ends, Eisenhower largely identified general war as a threat in his Great Equation
framework. War threatened the American way of life and created unfathomable levels of
destruction in the nuclear age. War threatened the ultimate interest—national survival.
Eisenhower’s perception of threats also differed from Truman in that he understood that
the United States would not be able to force the end of the Cold War simply by the threat
of nuclear war. Only time and the eventual decline of the Soviet Union would signal the
end of threats to American interests.
Because of the long-haul nature of the Cold War, Eisenhower stressed the need to
defend against the external threat posed by communism and the internal threat of
economic decline and social instability. Focusing too much on either would upset the
Great Equation. Ike rejected Truman’s idea of preparing for a year of maximum danger
because the mobilization method threatened America. He noted that “if you have a
maximum production program, to reach maximum strength by July 1st, 1954--1955--or
any other figure, how do you then suddenly level off and maintain it? It is simply not
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possible.”120 While the intelligence community focused on capabilities, the three Task
Forces that composed Project Solarium concluded that the Soviet Union had no intention
of attacking the United States and therefore planning for a year of maximum danger was
unnecessary.121 Focusing on the long-haul, and basing grand strategy on general threats to
US security, brought the unmentioned consequence of requiring a constant state of
preparedness. Rather than focusing on a specific threat based on an intention supported
by a known capability, Eisenhower started the nation down a long, and seemingly endless
road of constant defense. C.D. Jackson noted that the intention versus capability debate
disrupted policy formation.122 The capabilities of the Soviet Union could not be verified.
However, Eisenhower and his administration could determine Soviet military capabilities
better than political intentions and so defense policy focused on defending against
observable Soviet military power.

One Threat to Define All Interests: Soviet Communism
The development of NSC 162/2 and the numerous committees created to explore
American foreign policy options reflected Eisenhower’s systematic approach to national
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security. He focused on identifying interests and ends. While Eisenhower’s Great
Equation symbolized the ultimate interests of the United States—security and solvency—
the potential means for achieving those ends were only limited by resources. The specific
and achievable policies that supported the long-term interests of the United States had to
match the reality of American means. In a way, the interest in solvency acted to restrict
means. While Eisenhower framed the means of his grand strategy in similar format to the
Truman administration, he differed sharply from his predecessor in that he did not believe
resources would expand to fit ends, or that the nation should pursue expansionist defense
budgeting to stimulate the American economy. Ike believed security and solvency would
remain interests of the United States, and a growing coalition of free countries would
serve those interests. However, the capabilities of the Soviet Union to harm the United
States became a threat to the grand strategic aims of maintaining security and solvency.
NSC 162/2 reflected Eisenhower’s belief that Soviet leaders would not risk
general or nuclear war despite the Soviet Union’s possession of the means to do so. “The
uncertain prospects for Soviet victory in a general war, the change in leadership, satellite
unrest, and the U.S. capability to retaliate massively, make such a course improbable.”123
However, the American preoccupation with deterring Soviet military power failed to
differentiate the Soviet’s assumed capacity for attacking the United States from Soviet
intentions and what feasible ends would support Soviet grand strategy.
Eisenhower’s New Look is remembered in popular history as relying on the threat
of nuclear retaliation to deter the Soviet Union while his actual grand strategy utilized a
variety of means that he hoped would eliminate the possibility of war with the Soviet
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Union. The primacy of the Soviet threat—representing the menace of international
communism—led to NSC 162/2 becoming representative of America’s grand strategy in
the 1950s. Though NSC 162/2 is known as the New Look of Eisenhower’s global defense
policy, the study specifically focused on how “to meet the Soviet threat to U.S.
security.”124 While nuclear weapons served as a deterrent to the Soviet Union’s warmaking abilities, it did not address conflicts on the periphery. The New Look identified
three requirements of American national security: a strong military posture ““with
emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking
power,” a strong and stable economy, and the will of the American people.125 While the
idea of massive retaliation was part of NSC 162/2, it was not the sole means that
Eisenhower envisioned for countering communism. Rather, the basic national security
policy focused on the Soviet Union and exerted tremendous influence on how the United
States approached other foreign policy issues. Likewise, the prominence of nuclear
weapons in Cold War planning documents influenced later analyses of the New Look,
oversimplifying President Eisenhower’s multifaceted approach to the Cold War.

Limited Resources for an Expanding Conflict
Eisenhower commissioned the Jackson Committee in the spring of 1953 to
explore the utility of psychological warfare. The committee broadly defined national
means as either military, diplomatic, economic, or psychological.126 The Jackson
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Committee Report was the first significant document in the Eisenhower administration to
define national objectives, means, and limitations. Commissioned before the convening
of Project Solarium, it demonstrates that Eisenhower viewed information operations with
as much importance, if not more, than nuclear retaliation. The report noted that the Soviet
Union sought to avoid general war because it could threaten Soviet leaders’ domestic
political power, but also because political warfare appeared to be achieving Soviet
objectives.127
Diplomatic means focused on three groups in the new world order: the coalition
of the global free world, that is nations aligned with the United States; the communist
coalition centered on the Soviet Union and communist China; and the neutral or nonaligned countries that gained independence and power as rising nationalism and anticolonial movements gained traction in the post-war era. The Jackson Report noted that
“A basic feature of the conflict—one that underlies and largely determines the conduct of
the struggle—is that it is a conflict between coalitions, the one an imposed coalition
dominated by the Kremlin, the other a voluntary coalition led by the United States.”128
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Even in this key policy document, the Cold War’s moral ideology found a place next to
analysis. Whether the American or Soviet coalition was voluntary or imposed depended
on the perspective of each nation. As the Jackson Committee identified, “National
security can ultimately be assured only in conjunction with strong and resolute allies
throughout the world. A world order of free and peaceful nations has become a general
objective of United States policy.”129 A larger coalition ensured military and economic
strength while also serving as a hopeful sign that nations around the world found
democratic capitalism more beneficial than communism.
Economic aid took form as a general economic stimulus—such as the European
Recovery Plan—military or security force funding, or trade relations. Eisenhower sought
to limit economic aid and attempted to substitute its stabilizing effect by focusing on
trade. Trade also served as an offensive instrument of national power. Dulles wrote
Senator McCarthy that trade with China could control its economy while also obtaining
resources required for American security.130 Trading with communist nations, or nonaligned states, displayed “the economic superiority of free enterprise” and could convince
states to reject communism.131 Trading with ideological enemies fit Eisenhower’s
rejection of isolationism. Refusing to trade with enemies did not guarantee the enemy’s
economic collapse and it prevented America from influencing foreign populations. The
Jackson Committee noted that “Efforts to intensify these restrictions may well be resisted
129
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by allied countries who regard them as harmful to their own economic interests.”132
Economic aid also acted as a form of information operations because any disparity
between American promises and the effect of economic aid to foreign countries could
serve as discrediting information that the Soviet Union could use to divide the free world
coalition.
The Jackson Committee concluded that political warfare served as a more useful
term to describe the effect Eisenhower desired. Just as Kennan argued that political
warfare constituted all means of national power short of general war, the Jackson
Committee argued that “the ‘psychological’ aspect of policy is not separable from policy,
but is inherent in every diplomatic, economic or military action. There is a
“psychological” implication in every act, but this does not have life apart from the act.”133
Eisenhower agreed, telling Dulles that, “After all, psychological warfare can be anything
from the singing of a hymn up to the most extraordinary kind of physical
sabotage.”134Political warfare—the attempt to achieve national objectives without
resorting to general war—potentially weaponized every interaction with other nations.
The Jackson Committee’s conclusion about political warfare reflected George
Kennan’s view of war in the nuclear age. This is but one example of Cold War grand
strategy consisting of different strains of the same theme competing for relevance and
acceptance throughout the Cold War. Though the political and rhetorical nature of
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presidential elections and administrations creates partitions in how society considers the
history of American grand strategy, the bureaucratic nature of federal government makes
it unsurprising that rather than each administration developing distinct approaches to
containment, there were competing definitions and debates about American interests,
resources, and threats. Rather than each administration taking distinct approaches to
containment, the presence of career bureaucrats, outside advisors, and politicians
spanning multiple administrations suggested more continuity to the development of ideas
and the specific actors aligned with those philosophies.
Time and the American way of life were two other means not specified in NSC
162/2 or in the Task Force reports of Project Solarium. Eisenhower believed time would
eventually reveal the inadequacy of communism and that American values and systems
would be symbols of hope and emulation for rising nations and dissatisfied communist
societies. Eisenhower’s long-term approach allowed the Soviet Union to decline without
resorting to war while also requiring ends and means to be calculated for an unknown
length of conflict.135 Eisenhower deliberately guided American actions with a focus on
how the world perceived the coalition of free nations. In a memorandum providing
guidance about the Korean Armistice, Eisenhower noted that “We can show the entire
world that America and her allies are engaged in helping humans, not merely in asserting
and supporting any particular government system or policy.”136 Demonstrating the moral
and material worth of American society served as a means of grand strategy.137 The
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United States Ambassador to Italy, Clare Boothe Luce, said as such during a public
speech in 1953. “And now in closing, I address myself to the real ambassadors, who are
you the people. Sound diplomacy, it has been said, is simply Christian charity and
prudence operating in international affairs.”138 Americans and their lifestyle became
another method to counter the expansion of international communism.

Finding the Average Solution: Ends within Means
Eisenhower translated his Great Equation into several broad guidelines for
developing foreign policy in pursuit of his grand strategy. First, he sought to scale back
economic commitments while nurturing collective security to bolster defense and the free
world coalition. After listening to the Joint Chiefs of Staff present their views on the
Military and Mutual Security Programs, arguing for increasing the number of American
divisions in the army, the president noted that “that perhaps the Council should have a
report as to whether national bankruptcy or national destruction would get us first.”139 Ike
argued that “the cost of maintaining an American soldier in the field is fantastically
higher than the cost of maintaining a foreign soldier.”140 While preventing the expansion
of communism became the primary objective of the United States, Eisenhower
recognized the necessity of avoiding the image of an imperialist or colonialist
government.
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Henry A. Byroade, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and
African Affairs, noted the strong “opposition to foreign influence” in countries that had
recently emerged from colonial rule.141 Contrary to portrayals of ignorant American
officials not understanding the foreign policy challenge of working with new nations,
Byroade claimed that “there is no single problem which we can call a ‘colonial problem.’
Instead, there are many different kinds of problems which exist in many different areas.
Our Government must ever be alert to the necessity of doing those things which the
circumstances of time and place demand.”142 Eisenhower and his administration’s
primary foreign policy challenge remained how to inspire change within communist
societies rather than force it through war, while building enough military strength to deter
a potential Soviet attack against Europe or the United States. However, the Jackson
Committee Report warned that “Not all of the free world is prepared to view its problems
in the context of a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.”143
Eisenhower did not believe the United States had sole agency in ending the Cold
War, holding similar views as Kennan that internal forces in the Soviet Union would
eventually cause its downfall. Though Eisenhower did not believe the United States could
affect the end of communism, he hoped to support dissension within the Soviet Union
and its satellites to increase the regime’s instability. Part of that effort involved
demonstrating unity in the free world and the superiority of democratic capitalism. In his
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1954 State of the Union Address, the president noted that “the unity of the free world lies
our best chance to reduce the Communist threat without war.”144 However, preventing
communist expansion required military force, especially the threat of military force, to
influence Soviet calculations of interests and means. War had shaped the world order
during the Second World War and Eisenhower did not dismiss its importance in the Cold
War. However, Ike’s view of war shaped the nature of his approach to interests and
means that illuminated the Cold War era tension between policy objectives and war’s
utility. In one of his first public speeches as secretary of state, Dulles asserted that “We
shall never choose war as the instrument of our foreign policy.”145 Yet, how Eisenhower
defined war remained unclear.
Chapter 2 – Defining War and Peace

Eisenhower’s view of war developed throughout his military service but
especially as he witnessed the devastation of World War II as Supreme Allied
Commander, and later as he grappled with nuclear weapons and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization as its first Supreme Commander. Reflecting on his experience as a
commander, Ike noted that “The problems pertaining to a true Supreme command are
partially military, but they are also partially psychological, industrial, financial, and
political.” Eisenhower understood that war served a larger policy objective. Reflecting on
his decision about American policy toward Indochina in 1953, he wrote that “A proper
144
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political foundation for any military action was essential. Since we could not bring it
about, I gave not even a tentative approval to any plan for massive intervention.”146 The
objective of American domestic and foreign policy was the “prosperity, well-being, and
opportunity that extends from the most to the least fortunate among us.” The president
wanted to show “the direct connection between a prosperous and happy America, and the
execution of an intelligent foreign policy.”147 War might derail a stable economy and
require government intrusion through price controls and other forms of centralized
planning. Additionally, Ike believed that any general war would inevitably involve
nuclear weapons. The thought of nuclear war only heightened Ike’s aversion to war as a
suitable means of achieving American national interests. In fact, avoiding war became a
pillar of the president’s conceptualization of national security. War would not guarantee
peace and security. However, the threat of war’s destructive power could serve as a
deterrent to those who might threaten American prosperity and well-being.
“War” encompassed numerous instruments of national power: nuclear war,
general war, limited war, political warfare, and the credible threat of war, also known as
deterrence theory. The advent of nuclear weapons and the confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union brought limited war to the forefront of military and
political debate. As an instrument of national power, war had to support policy objectives
otherwise destruction became its only purpose. War alone, though, did not serve as a
surefire means to achieving peace. In fact, some in Eisenhower’s administration believed
that the Second World War had not, in fact, brought peace. While debating how to block
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Communist China’s entry into the United Nations C.D. Jackson wrote to Dulles that “the
UN charter was devised (a) before Hiroshima, and (b) on the assumption that the UN was
designed to maintain peace. The present UN Charter, therefore, reflects neither the
atomic age nor the fact that peace was never made.”148
War and peace evaded precise definition in Eisenhower’s administration. The
Jackson Committee noted that peace was approachable but unattainable, suggesting that
the term “cold war” did not “contribute to a clear understanding of the world struggle.”149
In a sense, Eisenhower carried on the crusade of the Second World War to free the globe
from tyranny, a useful rhetorical device to justify American intervention for shaping the
world order. Writing to the president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, Walter
P. Reuther, Eisenhower noted the need for material production and the dedication of the
American labor force during the Cold War. Though American industry had provided the
material to fight World War II, Ike told Reuther that, “unfortunately, peace and freedom
did not come to the world when the guns fell silent.”150 Continued efforts to achieve
peace would require more than just money and material. Peace meant a lasting political
settlement that benefitted the United States.
Nor did military success on the battlefield guarantee peace. An international order
that granted freedom to every person came to symbolize victory and a state of peace in
the Cold War. A more cynical observer might argue that peace meant America benefited
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from the world order.151 Given the continuing debate over the role of government in
relation to the individual, and what freedom meant, it is no surprise Eisenhower
continued to define peace in various ways. Speaking at the American Jewish
Tercentenary dinner in October 1954, Eisenhower stated that “The pursuit of peace is at
once our religious obligation and our national policy. Peace in freedom, where all men
dwell in security, is the ideal toward which our foreign policy is directed.”152Peace meant
security but in the age of nuclear weapons total security seemed quixotic. However,
Eisenhower’s view that nuclear war was unreasonable and unproductive in reaching
political settlements—one he believed shared by Soviet leaders—made peace
approachable if not ultimately attainable in spirit.
In this view, nuclear war could never serve as a viable means to achieve policy
objectives because of its destructive power and the inability to control escalation in
nuclear conflict. However, that did not mean the United States could abandon nuclear
war as a deterrent. Possessing a nuclear capability complicated the Soviet Union’s
decision to use conventional forces and freed America from the economic burden of
maintaining a large standing military. Thus, Eisenhower believed that “the dependence
that we are placing on new weapons [atomic bombs] would justify completely some
reduction in conventional forces—that is, both ground troops and certain parts of the
Navy.”153 Despite Eisenhower’s willingness to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent, he did
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not believe victory was possible in nuclear war. Writing to an acquaintance in 1956, Ike
remarked that “I firmly believe that the only way to “win” the war that sometimes seems
so threateningly close is to prevent it.”154 Ike’s last war as commander-in-chief was a
“war” against war.155
At a press conference in May 1956, Charles S. von Fremd of CBS News asked
Eisenhower if “it would be possible for any nation in this time, who had a large control of
hydrogen bombs, to win a war in a very short time, say, within 24 hours, by knocking out
the major cities and farm centers of population of its enemy?” Eisenhower’s reply shows
how he understood military power, victory, and the purpose of war. “Well, you say ‘win
a war.’ What would the other fellow be doing with his stuff while you were knocking out
those cities? You can destroy unquestionably the productive capacity of a nation if it is
carried out by surprise on the way you just state the case. But what then do you do to
him?”156 Simply destroying the other nation’s population centers—while enabling your
enemy to launch a nuclear strike—did not sound like victory to Eisenhower. Nor was it
feasible for achieving a political victory over communism. Speaking to members of the
State Department, Ike noted that “the soldier can no longer regain a peace that is usable
to the world. I believe that the best he could do would be to retain some semblance of a
tattered nation in a world that was very greatly in ashes and relics of
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destruction.”157 Nuclear war could only destroy, and the potential escalation from general
war to nuclear war challenged war’s utility in the atomic age.
General war, though less destructive, posed challenges to American interests and
means because of a perceived Soviet advantage in conventional forces and the potential
escalation from general war to nuclear war. Eisenhower agreed that “where American
interests are seriously jeopardized by unjustified outbreaks of minor wars,” military
strength retained utility.158 However, the president believed that “war implies a contest”
and a general war similar to the Second World War no longer offered the prospects of a
contest when “the outlook comes close to the destruction of the enemy and suicide for
ourselves.”159 Even limited wars like that in Korea challenged definitions of war and its
utility. The dwindling public support for the Korean War, combined with fears of
escalation, raised questions about what the United States could achieve through general
war.
War also posed different costs and benefits within the coalition of the global free
world. Eisenhower’s administration believed that the American public did not understand
the “true facts” concerning the nuclear arms race. The president wanted “to make people
realize their own individual responsibility,” noting that public opinion could influence
how and when nuclear weapons might be used.160 Europeans on the other hand, still

157

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at the Department of State 1954 Honor Awards Ceremony,”
dated October 19, 1954, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/232841 (accessed April 29, 2019).
158

Eisenhower to Richard Leo Simon, dated April 4, 1956, DDEP, 16:2114.

159

Ibid.

160

The National Security Meeting notes state Eisenhower believed it was, “at least possible that
some action would occur which would force the Government’s hand and cause us to resort to atomic
bombardment. He noted that popular pressure had forced the Government’s hand in the Spanish-American

55

recovering from the Second World War, wanted to ease tensions on the continent.
Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech in December 1953 held a different message for
the American public and the European nations. To the home front, Ike hoped that the
speech would awaken a sense of nuclear war’s destructive power and the need for greater
involvement in international affairs. To the Europeans, the president hoped to calm their
fears of another war by showing the willingness of the United States to pursue peaceful
cooperation in nuclear technology.161 Understanding that European leaders felt trapped
between two superpowers wielding nuclear weapons, the president sought to reduce fears
and prevent disintegration of NATO and other alliances.162 Contrary to the popular
narrative of Eisenhower relying on massive retaliation, he told his National Security
Council in February 1953 that “we certainly cannot depend solely, or perhaps even
primarily, on atomic bombs if we continue to regard Europe as our first line of
defense.”163 Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff, agreed that “it might well prove necessary to go forward with both the atomic
capability and the conventional military capability, but there would certainly have to be a
choice of priorities in timing.”164 Atomic weapons were just one instrument of national
power.
Service identities also complicated the debate as services sought to establish their
identity and prominence in the nuclear age. Partially due to the misidentification of the
New Look as solely relying on massive nuclear relation, “airpower was seen as the
dominant form of war, with land power regulated to the status of an auxiliary service.”165
This analysis misses the contested nature of American military strategy during
Eisenhower’s administration. The introduction to the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 100-5,
Operations, reveals the fragility of service identities. According to FM 100-5, the Army’s
“combat forces do not support the operations of any other component…. In any case, the
efforts of all components are directed toward insuring the success of the land force
operation.”166 By reducing the U.S. Air Force’s role to air-to-ground support, Army
leaders hoped to limit the acceptance of strategic airpower as a decisive means to wage
war. While the U.S. Army struggled to create an identity in the atomic age, the United
States Air Force’s belief in the airpower’s primacy led it to “mirror-image [its] own
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capabilities and objectives” in analyzing Soviet airpower.167 Not only did the U.S. Air
Forces Strategic Air Command (SAC) influence American policy, it also created the idea
of a Soviet Union Strategic Air Command (SUSAC)—a Soviet command that never
existed.168
Eisenhower wanted to avoid war’s larger consequences: unwanted commitments
such as occupation, greater centralization of government authority, and economic
disruption. When the National Security Council debated war objectives in the event of an
attack by the Soviet Union, Eisenhower quickly noted the decisions to be made after a
nuclear strike—would the United States occupy the Soviet Union? If not, could a political
settlement be reached?169 Likewise, he expressed a key planning consideration that few
other contemporaries had voiced: in the event of a nuclear attack, the United States would
most likely be hit and American troops would be needed more for civil control and
cleanup than for offensive operations overseas. Though there is still considerable debate
about how Eisenhower viewed nuclear strategy, especially equipping European allies
with nuclear weapons, his stance on war remained steady. President Eisenhower agreed
with Clausewitz that “war has an innate tendency to become absolute,” but it is important
to remember that he also believed Clausewitz’s theory that war had to be useful—it had
to aid in the achievement of a policy objective.170
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Seeking a middle ground, Eisenhower never considered total disarmament or
massive retaliation as feasible policies. Disarmament could only happen if the Soviet
Union reciprocated and the president did not believe the Soviets would allow
inspections.171 Replying to C.D. Jackson’s concerns about the “State-Defense quarrel”
over disarmament and enlarging the American atomic stockpile the president noted that
“I am not arguing either side of the particular question that you mention. I am merely
pointing out that there needs to be a bit of intellectual analysis of these grave problems
rather than screaming support of a position already taken.”172 Like his Middle Way
domestic political views, Eisenhower also believed in a balanced approach to containing
communism. Eisenhower did not want war, but the threat of war served as an instrument
of political warfare.
Limited wars in the Third World appeared as the most likely conflicts to surface
in the Cold War, yet the drain on American troops and the defense budget reduced their
long-term viability. Collective security thus became the most practicable means of
protecting the free world against communist expansion. Eisenhower wrote his childhood
friend Everett “Swede” Hazlett that, “the one indispensable thing to remember is that, if
the free world cannot provide for its ‘collective’ security, the alternative for every one of
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these nations, including our own, is an eventual fate that is worse than any kind of
expense or effort we can now imagine.”173
Eisenhower envisioned ‘redoubts’ across the globe that would be integrated with
local and regional security forces, while American power remained in reserve in the
United States ready to mobilize when required. Redeploying troops to the United States
from overseas provided certain advantages. It consolidated military power in preparation
for the outbreak of general war, and theoretically gave military commanders flexibility to
deploy where needed.174 Stationing fewer troops abroad also reduced the imperialist
image that Eisenhower wanted to avoid, in addition to reducing the economic strain of
supplying oversea bases.175 Eisenhower did not advocate withdrawing all troops from
oversea bases. The presence of American military forces acted as a trip-wire that would
trigger an American response.176 Positioning American military forces indicated
American national interests and announced that Soviet intrusion would not go
unnoticed—a key aspect of deterrence theory. Ike also wanted to avoid any sudden
withdrawal of American military forces that might “imply a change in basic intent” to
support and thus reassure other free nations.177
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War’s cost, destructive capability, and mismatch with identifiable ends created
tension between war’s unsuitability and the unavoidable confrontation with growing
Soviet military capability. Eisenhower’s New Look advocated “the maximum military
force which the country could “afford,” while at the same time creating conditions which
would allow quick expansion to the required force should the enemy begin clearly to
exhibit warlike intentions.”178 This sentiment encountered two issues that the Truman
administration had already faced. First, how much defense could the nation afford? While
Truman and policy-makers who embraced Keynesian economics believed the United
States could expand its military power, Eisenhower did not and feared insolvency. The
president’s attempt to balance security and solvency reflected the conservative “desire for
stability.”179
The second issue Eisenhower’s administration confronted was how to determine
communist intentions. A report by the CIA in March 1953 stated that “Our estimate of
Soviet long range plans and intentions are speculations drawn from inadequate
evidence.”180 The president’s relationship with Russians like General Georgy Zhukov,
along with his experience in the military and political arenas, most likely served as the
best tool to measure Soviet intentions.181
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Ironically, when war seemed the least useful for achieving policy objectives,
America’s capacity to wage war grew out of proportion to Eisenhower’s willingness to
wage war. Historian Ingo Trauschweizer argues that “Eisenhower’s New Look Defense
policy with its threat of Massive Retaliation raised serious questions about the utility of
ground forces in the atomic age.”182 For Eisenhower, the New Look defined the utility of
general war in the nuclear age. Despite criticism that the New Look forced America “to
choose between thermonuclear incineration or inaction,” Eisenhower wanted to reduce
the probability of war.183 War is not simply the act, but the capability and the intent.
Intent and capability served as a deterrent and Eisenhower allowed his military leaders to
increase the United States’ military capability despite his view of war’s utility.
Eisenhower developed America’s nuclear capability to counter the Soviet capability
described in National Intelligence Estimates.184
Still, deterrence posed a challenge to Eisenhower and his administration: how do
you manage building the capacity for the possibility of war without increasing the
intention for war? The United States and the Soviet Union appeared to be ‘arming’ past
each other in the conversation of national defense and weapon development. While the
Soviets sought to close the nuclear gap benefitting the United States, the U.S. military
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and intelligence communities struggled to calculate and build capable armed forces that
could defeat the Soviet Union’s growing military might.185 In the process, arming for
deterrence heightened insecurities and perpetuated an arms race. While Eisenhower
doubted that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would be able to restrict the
use of nuclear weapons if war broke out, he thought “it might tend to reduce very
materially the possibility of any war.”186
Simply building a massive stockpile of atomic weapons did not deter, and it could
have potentially fatal effects. The president remarked that “atomic weapons strongly
favor the side that attacks aggressively and by surprise. This the United States will never
do; and let me point out that we never had any of this hysterical fear of any nation until
atomic weapons appeared upon the scene and we knew that others had solved the
secret.”187 The shortened time to react to a nuclear attack necessitated faster reaction and
decision making. An air delivered nuclear retaliatory ability and an adequate Civil
Defense served as two main pillars of Eisenhower’s defense plan. While Civil Defense
would not amount to much in the wake of an atomic attack, it did serve as a form of
propaganda to “prepare Americans psychologically for a prolonged cold war and
armaments race.”188 Despite Eisenhower’s focus on the shortened warning time, his
administration still pursued mobilization planning that reflected ideas generated during
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and after the Second World War. The focus on mobilization planning—and the need for
access to raw materials—in turn drove strategy by making access to those materials a key
aspect of national security.189
Deterring the Soviet Union directly would not suffice to support American
diplomatic and economic policies intended to achieve American interests abroad.
Military action continued to be a viable option below the threshold of general war. Rather
than war militarizing diplomacy, American society’s desire to shape the world expanded
the acceptable limits of coercive diplomacy. The desire to change another nation’s
political system gained increasing importance in the ideological battle between capitalist
and communist systems. The belief that America had a duty to change other countries’
political outlook to save the free world meant that the Eisenhower’s administration
pushed the boundaries of coercive diplomacy. Colonel Edward Lansdale equated the
United States’ grand strategy to a “Pax Americanan in the world.”190 Diplomacy’s lack of
utility in changing another nation’s self-determination led to increasingly coercive
diplomatic practices. Throughout Eisenhower’s first year in office, war did not militarize
diplomacy. Rather, general war’s lack of utility meant that coercive diplomacy expanded
to fill the void resulting in a new standard of coercive interaction below general war:
political warfare.
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Chapter 3 – Political Warfare: Below the Threshold of War

During the Truman administration, George Kennan and other policy planners
noted the need to describe war short of outright conflict between the United States and
the Soviet Union. In a 1948 staff memorandum, Kennan argued that “Political warfare is
the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in a time of peace.” It utilized “all the
means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.” 191 The
American publics’ popular image, and in a way understanding, of war focused on the
recent experience of the United States in the Second World War—war as the
conventional or nuclear confrontation between military forces. However, war in the
policy makers construction remained the use of national power to achieve political
objectives. The term warfare described the means—both covert and overt in Kennan’s
framework—to achieve national objectives.192 The United States government could wage
war without public awareness or involvement because “war” to the American public
meant the clash of armies on the battlefield.193 Kennan observed that postwar America
had been handicapped “by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference
between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of
all political context, by a national tendency to seek a political cure-all, and by a
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reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of
[struggle, in and out of war.]” For Kennan, politics extended into war and therefore
waging war was a political act. Thus, Kennan could justify aggressive political actions as
political warfare without requiring Congressional involvement.194 Kennan cited the
British Empire and the Kremlin’s use of political warfare to maintain control as proof that
the United States could no longer ignore its use.195
Eisenhower approached the ideological nature of the Cold War with a familiarity
and belief in psychological operations that grew out of his own wartime experiences.196
Searching for options to counter the Soviet Union, Eisenhower commissioned the
Jackson Committee on 24 January 1953. He charged it with analyzing government
information operations and other policies that would promote the security of the global
free world. The United States could not destroy communism or defeat the Soviet Union
through general or nuclear war, but Eisenhower believed the United States had to find a
way to counter the spread of communism.
The Jackson Committee reached a conclusion similar to Kennan’s, recommending
the term political warfare and widening the scope of Cold War conflict by expanding the
means available to intervene against communist influence. The committee’s report also
stated that “specific goals of national action abroad should be defined in as precise
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political, diplomatic, economic, military or psychological terms as possible.”197 The
United States’ ends, capabilities, and policies had to be feasible otherwise “the
announcement of unrealizable goals and the arousing of excessive hopes in the satellite
countries or elsewhere, may have serious adverse consequences for the world position of
the United States.”198 C.D. Jackson, a committee member, consulted Colonel Edward
Lansdale about how to contain communism and promote governments that supported the
United States in Latin America. Lansdale believed that “psychological-political and paramilitary warfare” efforts were “technical necessities” for defeating communist
infrastructures in Latin American countries based on his experience in Indonesia.199
Eisenhower’s focus on identifying means to confront communist expansion
presented a more offensive grand strategy than that of the Truman administration. During
the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower characterized Truman’s response to
communism as weak.200 Despite Eisenhower’s tough stance on communism, his
association with the Republican party had international repercussions. The administration
found that, “the 1952 presidential campaign had an impact on US prestige in Europe that
was definitely adverse,” because the Republican party, though staunchly anti-communist,
was also the party of isolationists.201 The spread of communism, especially through local
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elections or nationalist revolutions, challenged “the credibility of U.S. international
leadership” and more importantly, the supposed superiority of democratic capitalism.202
While the Eisenhower administration determined that rolling back communism in the
Soviet Union and its satellites was unrealistic, political warfare could roll back
communism in other areas. Massive retaliation, containment, limited war, and rollback
did not represent either-or strategies for dealing with the communism threat. Rather, each
served as a viable means of advancing the interests of the United States depending on the
regional context and actors involved.
While many information programs existed prior to Eisenhower’s election, he
reviewed and reprioritized them, allocating more funding for programs like Voice of
America. The Jackson Committee noted that “in the event of war, radio will be a political
warfare weapon of major importance,” and the president believed that broadcasting
information and propaganda into the Soviet bloc remained the last “offensive” option
available in that area of the world. Information operations aimed to promote the image of
the United States while showing the contradictions and inadequacies of communism.203
Eisenhower continued the “Campaign of Truth” that President Truman created in 1950 to
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counteract Soviet propaganda.204 The radio thus became a primary weapon in countering
communism.
Measures other than war, in Kennan’s words, also included trade with allies and
communist countries. At a National Security Council Meeting in July 1953, Eisenhower
reminded the group that “We should not forget that we are trying to induce the satellites
to come over to our side by judicious use of trade.”205 The president felt that “the purpose
of our trade should be to split the Soviet world.”206 Trade policies could also serve to
attack communist infrastructures. CIA Director Allen Dulles noted that any blockade on
communist China would create a “severe strain” on the Chinese-Manchurian railway as
supplies would have to be routed overland.207 John Foster Dulles, Allen’s brother and the
Secretary of State, stated that the challenges in Latin America were “largely economic”
and that the “vital element in their solution must be a flow of capital” into the region.208
Trade, aid, and advertising the prosperity of the free world coalition targeted the
economic foundations of communist expansion.
The administration also strategically promoted the American way of life. In a
national broadcast, the Secretary of State told the public that “the heart of a successful
204
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foreign policy is our national conduct and example.” He argued that American citizens
could speed the fall of communism by “demonstrating by our own performance, by our
own examples, how good freedom is and how much better it is than despotism is.”209
Guiding countries toward policies that modernized economies and modeled American
democracy acted as means to influence countries perceived as susceptible to communist
influence. While modernization theory is associated with the Kennedy administration,
Eisenhower promoted similar concepts. Yet because he wanted to reduce the United
States’ economic commitments, the president initially promoted trade over
aid.210Regardless of the means, economic development became the cure to symptoms of
instability in developing countries. According to John Foster Dulles, economic
development was “the way the United States developed, and that [was] the best and
surest way for [Latin America] to develop.”211 While Dulles’ statement offered a
simplistic comparison it typifies the American centric view of how to solve instability
around the globe.
The president also allowed the CIA and other actors to take covert action against
foreign countries. Eisenhower had identified a way for war to be useful in the atomic age.
In theory, covert action protected American credibility and other nations paid the price in
troops and instability. Eisenhower did not advocate for covert action in the Soviet Union
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or its satellites, but it remained an option for countries in the periphery.212 Covert
operations in Europe did occur, but the attention given to events in Europe, along with
the threat of escalating tensions with the Soviet Union, led to more information
campaigns than covert paramilitary efforts.213 As historian H.W. Brands has noted,
“ideology demanded that the United States carry on the struggle against communism;
pragmatism required that the struggle be conducted by means other than direct
confrontation with the Soviet Union.”214
Measures short of war challenged the conceptual framework of war and peace that
agencies like the CIA and the Department of Defense used to frame their actions and
authority. While a declaration of war would signal different responsibilities and allow for
expanded means, political warfare blurred the lines between war and peace. A
memorandum for the National Security Council on covert operations noted the necessity
of separating covert operations into two categories, peacetime and wartime. “The above
division appears to be a most logical one inasmuch as it is very difficult to believe that
we would send in parties to accomplish physical destruction in any phase of a ‘cold’
war.”215 And yet Eisenhower’s administration would challenge that logic in Iran and
Guatemala.
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Eisenhower’s use of political warfare also challenged the legal definition of war.
Constitutional law gives Congress the right to declare war—establishing war time—yet
tensions between the United States’ military that remained deployed to ‘redoubts’ around
the globe resulted in accidental (and deadly) aerial and ground engagements. The United
States employed military force around the globe, and society recognized the Cold War as
a contest of survival, yet Eisenhower only obtained authorization for the use of military
force from Congress twice during his presidency.216 Documents clearly show
Eisenhower’s respect for the congressional role in declaring war, especially the actual
commitment of American troops.217 However, Ike also believed in a strong executive
branch as his fight against the Bricker Amendment shows.218 The legal and Constitutional
distinction between war and political warfare is evident. As president, Eisenhower would
use instruments of national power to achieve policy objectives, yet he would not use
American ground combat troops in direct engagement with communist forces.
Congressional approval would not be sought for anything less.
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Political warfare also changed the nature of victory in the Cold War. No longer
would military might be publicly hailed as the guarantor of victory—or American
credibility. Following the Project Solarium presentation, Vice President Nixon worried
over the decline of the United States’ prestige, which he defined as the United States’
“ability to influence other people because of their attitudes toward us, as distinguished
from our ability to exert influence through the use of special incentives.”219 The report
noted a widely held perception that the United States was “hysterical” about communism
and militaristic.220 Historian Ira Chernus has argued that peace represented a continual
struggle against communism. Eisenhower “taught the nation to desire peace as its highest
goal while giving unlimited support to waging cold war.”221 As the political definition of
victory changed from unconditional surrender to patience with firmness, military
planning focused on victory divorced from the reality of war’s destructive power in the
age of atomic warfare.222
Relying so heavily on political warfare led to questions of Eisenhower’s sincerity
in ‘waging peace’ that continues today. While historians like Ira Chernus characterize
Eisenhower as deceptive and developing a state of national insecurity, Eisenhower’s goal
was the prevention of general war. Though Eisenhower surely possessed the cunning and
forethought to be deceptive, a more balanced analysis of his personal correspondence,
speeches, and diary entries reveals a hopeful but cautious man. Ike’s diary entry two days
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after his “Atoms for Peace” speech shows his willingness to extend a cooperative hand to
the Soviets while still upholding American security. He justified America offering to
hand over part of its nuclear stockpile to an international agency because “even in the
event that the USSR would cooperate in such a plan for ‘propaganda purposes’…the US
would still have nuclear superiority.”223 Whether Eisenhower waged peace or increased
violence in the world, one goal was sincere—confronting communism.224
The reliance on political warfare to achieve grand strategy fit the threat-based
perception of Eisenhower’s National Security Council. Political warfare could avoid
war’s physical destruction in America, but a militaristic mentality spread to diplomatic
and economic policies that perpetuated conflict on the periphery. The belief that general
war lacked utility due to nuclear war and fears of insolvency, while still aiming to defeat
the Soviet Union and global communism, created unintended consequences. Diplomacy,
economic, and information means had to become more aggressive to wage political
warfare. Dulles correctly stated that the United States would not use war to achieve its
national self-interest. However, wars were fought in pursuit of American interests by
others and against people who did not pose a physical threat to the United States. War
would thus defend the United States’ credibility, ability to access natural resources, and
the promotion of a cohesive and prosperous free world coalition.
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Chapter 4 – A Contradiction in Terms

Waging Peace: Eisenhower and Covert Action
Eisenhower’s second presidential memoir may be titled Waging Peace, but the
president’s Cold War policies created conditions more closely associated with war than
peace, especially in the Third World. The coups sponsored by the United States in Iran
and Guatemala challenge the definition of war as socially sanctioned violence. Violence,
funded and encouraged by the administration, played a role in both coups. Yet the covert
nature of coups separated the socially sanctioned nature of war from its violence. While
the American experience of Eisenhower’s New Look defense strategy remained peaceful,
countries considered on the periphery of the Cold War—like Iran and Guatemala—
suffered long term social and political unrest that made the Cold War simply war.
Historian Andrew Rathmell has argued that “No diplomatic or political history can
explain events if it omits the roles played by covert action and political violence.”225
Rathmell’s statement is relevant to understanding Eisenhower’s definition of war. Just as
Eisenhower’s policies focused on more than the Soviet Union, so a thorough analysis of
his policy must consider the role of war beyond the scope of general or nuclear war. In
sanctioning coups, Eisenhower removed society’s role in sanctioning violence. This
redefined war as state sanctioned violence to achieve political objectives.226 American
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society became further removed from the decision to wage war. Separating society’s
approval from state directed violence is problematic when policy makers must decide
when diplomatic interactions will move from competition to conflict. Who makes the
decision to move from competition to conflict? If conflict means war—the use of
violence to achieve political outcomes—then society should be involved in that decision
according to the United States Constitution. Eisenhower approved regime change in Iran
and Guatemala without Congressional or public approval. While the public’s will may
have been carried out through the use of coups—containing communism—the use of
violence was not justified by social consensus or Constitutional authority.
Presidential power is most evident in foreign policy decisions that support a
nation’s grand strategy. Eisenhower believed in Constitutional checks and balances. He
did not consider unilateral action by a single branch healthy for the nation, though he
acknowledged that emergencies required action.227 The president also believed that if a
foreign policy decision involved the use of American troops, he would need
Congressional approval.228 Ike summarized his decision-making process thusly: “Having
gotten the issue well defined in my mind, I try in the next step to determine what answer
would best serve the long term advantage and welfare of the United States and the free
world. I then consider the immediate problem and what solution can we get that will best
conform to the long term interests of the country and at the same time can command a
declaring war? Or, is it the state acting on the mandate of representing the larger interests of society without
needing to publicly announce its actions?
227
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sufficient approval in this country so as to secure the necessary Congressional action.”229
However, the president also believed in the executive’s role in executing foreign policy.
Eisenhower approved coercive diplomatic measures, like coups, that would otherwise fit
the traditional definition of war if American military force had been used. He also
approved covert action by CIA and foreign actors to achieve objectives that likely would
have lacked public support to wage general war. More important to the president, covert
action could achieve objectives that would otherwise generate a direct conflict with the
Soviet Union.
Due to the Cold War’s ideological and political context, the policy objective of
countering the Soviet Union influenced the development of Eisenhower’s Latin America
policy. An intelligence update by Allen Dulles in February 1953 noted that “the four
major trends in South and Central America were trends in the direction of economic
nationalism, regionalism, neutralism, and increasing Communist influence.”230 This
endangered the United States’ “sources of supply for such strategic materials as copper,
petroleum, and tin,” while also delaying diplomatic agreements for “military
cooperation.”231 Already in 1953, Guatemala had been identified as an “approaching
crisis.”232 The Truman administration had identified Iran and Guatemala as foreign policy
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challenges, and Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles echoed that
assessment in a televised speech on 27 January 1953.
The coups in Iran and Guatemala reflect the tension between presidential and
congressional power. Although Eisenhower respected Congress’s role in declaring war,
the president also defended the executive branch’s prerogative in foreign policy. Foreign
policy is well within the authority of the presidency, but what about war? A coup is
coercive and violent foreign policy—political warfare at the extreme—so does that act of
war require congressional approval? The Cold War’s ideological nature blurred the line
between foreign policy and political warfare. Likewise, Eisenhower did not clearly
distinguish the relationship between political warfare and war.
Eisenhower’s use of covert action to prevent general or nuclear war redefined the
relationship between war and society as he executed his grand strategy. Covert regime
change aligned with Eisenhower’s view of war’s utility in the Cold War. The Iranian and
Guatemalan crises emerged during Truman’s administration and Eisenhower inherited
them. Though the coups in Iran and Guatemala used foreign troops and agents, with
paramilitary assistance unattributed to America, covert operations and subversive acts
like Indonesia also involved the US Navy and Air Force.233 The question remains: did
Eisenhower consider coups as coercive diplomacy, political warfare, or general war
through proxy? Analyzing the United States’ actions in Iran and Guatemala during the
early 1950s help answer those questions.
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Unsanctioned War: Eisenhower’s Preventative War in Iran
Foreign interference in Iranian domestic politics began long before the Americansponsored coup in 1953. Iran’s history is replete with internal political and social
struggles that influenced its development. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution in 1905
occurred after a century of intermittent conflict with Russia. A famine in the 1870s and
again in the 1920s killed millions of Iranians, all while Iranian political parties struggled
for power. Internal political conflict, along with foreign interference by Russia and
Britain prior to the Second World War prevented a strong Iranian government from
gaining control of its territory and future. Historian Rashid Khalidi notes that “the Cold
War was only another episode in this region’s recent history of being a target for external
intervention.”234 The 1953 coup sponsored by Eisenhower’s administration is not unique
because it represents foreign interference in Iranian politics; it is important because it
represents a new method the United States used to achieve political outcomes in the Cold
War. Moreover, it blurred the lines between war and political warfare.
Iran had served as a site of great power cooperation during the Second World.
Great Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941 to prevent Germany from
seizing strategic oil fields that would have provided much needed supplies for its
conquest of the Soviet Union. Likewise, Lend-Lease aid flowed from the United States to
Russia through Iran. The Tehran Conference of 1943 also served as a symbolic and
physical site of cooperation between wartime allies. Despite the cooperation during the
Second World War, the global nature of the Cold War reaffirmed Iran’s role as a site of
great power competition.
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Oil and regional access had made Iran important prior to the 1950s. However, the
ideological nature of the Cold War, and the need to create strong coalitions created a new
form of competition that placed Iran between the United States and the Soviet Union.
American interests in Iran reflected the multifaceted nature of the Cold War. The United
States wanted to keep Soviet communism from expanding into Iran and threatening the
free world’s access to oil. To contain the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies
retained World War II military bases throughout the world that enabled the United States
to strike the Soviet Union with air deliverable nuclear weapons. Retaining Iran’s support,
or more aptly controlling its political direction, became a key American interest. A
Truman administration official noted that “the best we can hope for is to prevent Iran’s
falling into Soviet hands during the cold war period.”235
American options toward Iran consisted of economic, political, and military
means. While the United States supported Greece and Turkey with aid—and membership
in NATO—Iran received little support. The Truman administration noted that “Iran does
not fall into the category of countries we have helped too lavishly. We have in fact given
the Iranians very little; they feel this keenly in view of what we have done for Greece and
Turkey, and are genuinely skeptical of the sincerity of our interest in Iran.” What made
this apparent slight even more insulting was that “Iran is threatened with an actual Soviet
invasion (as distinct from an indirect, Soviet-inspired invasion).” 236 Other reports stated
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that if the situation continued Britain might “send troops to southern Iran.”237 Despite
Iran’s importance—and the numerous foreign governments intervening— the United
States efforts during the Truman administration meant that “it would be somewhat
unrealistic to expect Iran to throw itself lock, stock, and barrel into the Western camp—
particularly in the absence of military commitments from [the United States].”238
To prevent Iran’s fall to communism, the United States looked for a dynamic
leader that would rely on the United States for support and stem the growth of communist
parties in Iran. This would be especially important since the United States was unwilling
to provide a large amount of foreign aid, especially military support, to Iran. Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadeq had been elected in 1951 based on what American
intelligence officers called an ““out-with-all-foreigners” propaganda campaign.”239
Despite Mossadeq’s call for less foreign interference, a national intelligence estimate in
January 1953 noted that “the Mossadeq regime almost certainly desires to keep US
support as a counterweight to the USSR and appears to want US economic and military
assistance.”240 The United States feared that the Iranian communist party, Tudeh, would
gain power as Mossadeq built his domestic coalition. However, the national intelligence
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estimate acknowledged that “the Communist Tudeh Party is not likely to develop the
strength to overthrow the National Front by constitutional means or by force during the
period of this estimate.”241 Mossadeq did not pose a direct threat to American interests,
but his cooperation with the Tudeh party, and the United States belief that he would not
hold power for a long period of time, was a concern. An intelligence agent in Iran
expressed unease that even if the United States supported Mossadeq, he would eventually
retire and the United States would “be right back where we were in 1950—looking for
another [leader].”242
The United States thus embarked upon regime change to prevent Iran from
turning communist.243 The national intelligence estimate provided to the Eisenhower
administration shortly before Ike’s inauguration noted that “the USSR has the capability
for greatly increasing its overt and covert interference.” However, as Mossadeq struggled
to maintain a domestic coalition, and the CIA predicted a Tudeh sponsored coup,
planning and preparation for Mossadeq’s overthrow—Operation AJAX—began in the
spring of 1953.244
Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, led the small
American team responsible for staging the coup in Iran. After the operation received
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approval, Roosevelt traveled to Iran and began preparing for the coup in July 1953.245
Meanwhile the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, steadily lost influence in Iran,
and Mossadeq had become more reliant on the Tudeh party for support. Roosevelt
initiated the coup in the beginning of August and on 20 August, Prime Minister
Mossadeq resigned paving the way for the Shah to appointed Major General Fazlollah
Zahedi as the new prime minister.246 The immediate effect of covert action represented a
stunning success for the Eisenhower administration. Iran went from a potentially
communist leaning state to one ruled firmly by the Shah who if not loyal, understood the
power and influence the United States had in Iran. Ike and his advisers believed a
potential war between the United States and the Soviet Union over Iran’s political future
had been avoided.
The long-term consequences of the coup continue today. In the process of
overthrowing Mossadeq, the United Sates also overthrew the first democratically elected
government in postwar Iran. Historian Stephen Kinzer has noted that the coup “was a
great trauma for Iran, the Middle East, and the colonial world.”247 The coup attempted to
fix Iranian domestic political power through external interference meaning that tensions
and ideological divides had merely been suppressed, not resolved. In fact, Ayatollah
Ruholla Khomeini’s path to power is attributed to Mossadeq’s overthrow. An outspoken
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critic of the Shah and his relationship with the United States, Khomeini eventually
overthrew of the Shah during the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

The “atrocious harmlessness of all things”: Guatemala and Covert Violence
The 1954 American sponsored coup in Guatemala remains a morally and
politically confusing event. The confusion appeared in an early intelligence summary
from 1952 which argued that Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz’s policies modeled
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. Yet, fears of Arbenz’s leftist policies
like land and labor reform, not to mention his act of legalizing the Guatemalan
Communist Party in 1952, made Guatemala the primary concern of American
policymakers worried about communist expansion into Central America. Historian Piero
Gleijeses has noted that “the Guatemalans’ major sins were two: their ‘persecution’ of
American companies and their irresponsible attitude toward communism.”248 Just as
American involvement in Guatemala, and the rest of Central America, began before
Eisenhower’s presidency, so did the planning for a coup to bring Guatemala in line with
the United States’ objectives. The CIA presented Truman the plan for a coup to
overthrow Arbenz in 1952, but Secretary of State Dean Acheson stopped the operation
because he believed it would reflect badly on the United States.249
Like the Iranian coup, a potential communist takeover proved to be the only threat
in Guatemala that Eisenhower used to justify intervention. Echoing the CIA’s evaluation
of Mossadeq, a report in 1952 claimed that “although President Arbenz appears to
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collaborate with the Communists and extremists to the detriment of Guatemala’s relations
with the US, I am quite certain that he personally does not agree with the economic and
political ideas of the Guatemalan or Soviet Communists.”250 Arbenz was Guatemala’s
second democratically elected ruler after the Second World War. His efforts to build
domestic coalitions necessarily included communist, or leftist leaning groups, though it
raised concerns in Eisenhower’s administration, since the inclusion of communists in the
Guatemalan government seemed to challenge U.S. power in the Western Hemisphere.
With the United States seeking to build a free world coalition that proved the inadequacy
of communism, it could not afford to have Guatemala spurning American businesses, and
more importantly, U.S. authority. As with Iran, American policy makers imagined
Guatemala as a domino, where communist influence in one country would inevitably lead
to communist encroachment in the region.251
Scholars have also shown an uncomfortable connection between the United Fruit
Company (UFC), the Eisenhower administration, and intelligence reports about
Guatemala.252 The United States had significant business ties in the country, principally
through the UFC, which owned Guatemala’s only major port, Puerto Barrios, in addition
to significant portions of the country’s railroad and communication infrastructure.253
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However, the link between Eisenhower’s administration and the UFC does not explain
why the coup occurred nor is it supported in the documentary record.254 What is clear is
that Eisenhower linked Arbenz’s communist associations with fears that Soviet
communism was gaining a foothold in Central America.
The American sponsored coup utilized all instruments of political warfare
outlined in Eisenhower’s New Look: economic, information, military aid, and
paramilitary support. Yet psychological methods proved most essential to the coup’s
success. When the small military force under ex-Guatemalan army Colonel Carlos
Castillo Armas halted just seven miles across the Honduran border after “invading”
Guatemala, the coup appeared to be in danger. To tip the balance of public support
towards Armas’ insurrection, and to persuade the Guatemalan army to cease supporting
Arbenz, the CIA bombed selected targets in Guatemala City. The spectacle of planes
bombing the city, along with the Guatemalan army commanders’ fears that further
resistance would result in the United States deploying troops led to Arbenz’ capitulation
on 27 June.
On a strategic level, the coup also had psychological value. Historian James
Callanan has argued that the coup “assisted Eisenhower’s efforts to combat, and draw
attention away from, a communist advance in Indochina” as well as “helping Washington
in its drive to meet the Marxist challenge head-on in Latin America.”255 It served as a
symbol of the United States power and a warning to other Latin American states about
the consequences that would come from experimenting with communist like policies.
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The fervor of anti-communist thought driving the United States decision to wage
action in Iran and Guatemala is best represented by U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, John
S. Peurifoy. He used William James’ phrase “atrocious harmlessness” in his 19 June
1954, telegram to Allen Dulles to emphasize the need for American intervention.256
Peurifoy asked for CIA air assets to drop bombs on Guatemala City to support the
insurrection. Peurifoy thought inaction would amount to “atrocious harmlessness”—
foolishly standing by in the wake of communist aggression. Not utilizing war’s violence
in what had been a relatively stable, democratic nation would require restraint
unfathomable in the ideologically fueled Cold War.257
His plea for violent action raises the question: if war is socially sanctioned
violence, are some forms of state sponsored violence more just than others? This would
require political aims—capitalism or communism—to possess normative values. Yet,
each system is a social construction of how people and economies should relate. Why
bother with just war theory if war is based on social consensus which is formed by of its
own social construction? The argument is not whether a communist or democratic
capitalist society is morally correct or economically feasible. Rather, does using violence
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for a just end outweigh the consequences of using violence? The question illuminates
Eisenhower’s justification for sponsoring the coup. His administration truly believed a
communist regime would bring more social unrest and violence to Guatemala. The rise of
a communist Guatemala would also enable the Soviet Union to gain power through
political warfare by exploiting communist success in Central America.258 As the first use
of “war” by the United States after the Korean War, the coups signaled the characteristics
of American Cold War foreign policy decision making: adherence to the domino theory,
fear of appearing weak (Munich analogy), and a desire to protect American prestige by
not committing the armed forces of the United States.259
There was no overwhelming public demand in America for Iran and Guatemala to
be invaded, but the fear and distrust of communist influence in those countries was public
knowledge. As Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin argued, “Concern over the
potential spread of communism was clearly the fundamental stratum on which the
Eisenhower administration’s global policies rested.” If “the American public could be
persuaded that the Truman administration had possessed the capacity to halt the march of
communism in China and was responsible for its ‘loss’ to the ‘Free World,’ then surely
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successor administrations might well be held responsible if any further areas of Asia were
lost to Communist control.”260
Though Eisenhower wanted to avoid general war does not mean he thought
America should not shape the world order. The president’s conceptualization of political
warfare described everything from humanitarian assistance to offensive information
operations. Covert action allowed the American public to avoid the consequences of war
while also offering the possibility of a quick resolution to an international problem. While
Eisenhower focused on the long term when crafting policy, he did not consider that long
term social and political instability in the Third World would be the legacy of his covert
action programs.

Making War: NSC 162/2 and the Militarization of Foreign Policy
Relying on political and covert warfare as a substitute for general war militarized
an already threat focused National Security state. Actions below the threshold of general
war had short term utility in resolving foreign policy challenges in states that had the
potential to upset the existing global balance of power. Despite Eisenhower’s objective to
avoid direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, he supported economic warfare that
militarized international trade policies in his attempts to contain the Soviet Union’s warmaking ability. Little thought, however, was given to Soviet reactions in losing their
access to strategic resources. Eisenhower’s national security council never seriously
considered that Soviet expansion might also be a reactionary measure to maintain access
to strategic resources. Petroleum and other natural resources had long been identified as
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key resources and even though Eisenhower wanted to avoid war he could not avoid
preparing for war. The free world military’s natural resource requirements necessitated a
global focus and extended American interests. Nations and regions that seemingly had
little significance to American security became prioritized based on their resources and
their potential impact on American credibility.
Credibility, and the perception that the Soviet Union only responded to strength,
militarized American interactions because overt military strength broadcasted American
interests and intent more than covert power or political warfare. Even in countries like
Vietnam, where Eisenhower sought to avoid a military commitment and the image of
America as an imperial power, he expanded an American presence because of
credibility—an unintended consequence of placing more importance on political warfare.
The importance of perception, in short, helped to justify interventionism. In this way, the
coups in Iran and Guatemala made sense when both countries were seen as threats to
American interests.
Moreover, such expanded American interests tended to create conflict between
the global free world and communist nations. War existed as a possible instrument of
national power though Eisenhower considered war as the last option to be used in the
pursuit of American interests. The question remains: did the coups in Iran and Guatemala
indicate Eisenhower did not believe that communism would eventually fail in the “longhaul,” or were they a pragmatic use of limited force to avoid committing American armed
forces—and prestige-- later? Analyzed from Eisenhower’s conceptualization of war, the
coups seemed to have arisen from the belief that general war was not a practical foreign
policy option. Diplomacy and information operations were not effective. Rather than
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continue in uncertain stalemate—or in Eisenhower’s mind, risk the more dangerous
prospect of communist expansion—coercive force was used in both countries to achieve
the superficial objective of preventing communist leadership from gaining control of
supposedly vital areas in Latin America and the Middle East.

Conclusion: The Utility of War in Grand Strategy

In 1957, political scientist Robert Osgood analyzed limited war to answer a
question that troubled policy-makers: “how can the United States employ military power
as a rational instrument of foreign policy when the destructive potentialities of war
exceed any rational purpose?” 261 Eisenhower had grappled with that same question in
formulating his New Look. “I have spent my life,” he said, “in the study of military
strength as a deterrent to war, and in the character of military armaments necessary to win
a war.”262 Eisenhower believed that America had the means to address a variety of
interests, yet he consistently worried about military escalation between the superpowers.
Political warfare, to him, offered the flexibility to meet communist expansion without the
risk of general war. However, Eisenhower did use military power in a flexible manner; he
allowed the development of tactical nuclear weapons, projected American military power
across the globe, and confronted the Soviet Union and communist China with an
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increasingly powerful American military establishment. Using military power as a
deterrent and not as an instrument retained the utility, and reason, for a strong military.263
A military response did not necessarily require armed conflict, merely the
possibility of conflict. Eisenhower believed that the United States could never first use
nuclear weapons or conventional forces against the Soviet Union, yet it could use military
power as a deterrent. By expanding the United States nuclear arsenal, Ike wanted to
communicate the infeasibility of general and nuclear war. Ike hoped the mere possibility
of incalculable destruction posed by nuclear weapons would prevent even the
consideration of general war.264 Just as Eisenhower’s view of nuclear war’s utility and
the applicability of political war reflected ideas from the Truman administration,
Eisenhower’s concept of general war’s utility continued into the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations though in a much less restrained manner. Limited war only appealed to
Eisenhower if the host nation had the willpower and ability to fight; Ike did not want to
unilaterally commit American troops or treasure to local conflicts.
Moreover, his focus on creating economic growth and prosperity to prevent
instability and susceptibility to communist subversion shows the growing consensus of
modernization theory—a theory that projected an American narrative onto other nations.
Eisenhower’s New Look also shifted the confrontation with communism to the Third
World, bringing the political violence of war with it. Though Eisenhower supported the
efforts of nations seeking self-determination in the aftermath of colonialism, American

263

Ibid.

264

“Bipartisan Leadership Meeting,” dated December 14, 1954, Staff Notes January thru Dec. ’54,
Box 4, DDE Diary Series, AWF, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, 1953-61, DDEL.

92

support inevitably forced those nations into the global conflict between the free world
and communist states.
The relative peace of the Cold War during Eisenhower’s presidency was only
peaceful for America and European nations as the indirect confrontation with
communism over strategic resources grew in the periphery. While Eisenhower claimed
that America never “lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration,” that
statement ignores the underlying violence of the Cold War.265 At the 30 July 1953
National Security Council meeting, CIA Director Allen Dulles briefed the council on the
loss of an US Air Force reconnaissance plane. After Dulles noted that Soviet MiG-15s
had shot down the plane north of Japan and that four surviving crew were “believed to
have been picked up by Soviet PT-boats,” the president inquired if the United States “had
shot down any of their reconnaissance planes.” After General Bradley confirmed that the
United States “had destroyed some reconnaissance planes” near US naval forces, Ike
remarked that “we and the Russians know that if U.S. planes go toward Vladivostok they
are not simply on a training mission. Hence the incident was not as unprovoked as it
might appear to be at first glance.”266 A few months prior, just a week after Stalin died,
Czech aircraft had shot down American and British military planes causing the death of
numerous servicemembers. True, general war and nuclear war did not occur but the
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violence occurring around the world between states questions the idea of the Cold War as
a “long peace.”267
Violence in the Third World exposed the Cold War’s violence even more. Though
questions of causation and agency remain, Eisenhower enacted policies and programs
that increased the interventionist nature of American foreign policy.
In pursuing the unattainable but approachable state of peace, President
Eisenhower’s approach to foreign policy reveals the space between peace and war. If
peace is unattainable, is war unavoidable? Are countries always at war or in competition
with one another? Is human interaction destined for conflict? Political scientist Klaus
Knorr has argued that:
Warfare states do exist, here and elsewhere, because the international
system and most of its actors are such that military aggression and war
remain a fateful contingency; and, thus far at least, mankind has found no
workable alternative to this system. As long as it does not, the United
States in particular will be unable to do without maintaining an extensive
warfare state. This country cannot hope to receive effective protection
from the warfare states of other nations; rather, the military security of a
great many less powerful countries is in fact dependent on American
protection and the American warfare state.268
Eisenhower may have avoided general or nuclear war, but he also emphasized the
need for psychological and political warfare. Even trade among allies and non-aligned
countries was governed by the overarching philosophy of the New Look. Victory
required more than military force. “While it is obvious that in thirty to sixty days the two
giants in the atomic field might conceivably accomplish a mutual destruction of terrifying
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proportions,” Eisenhower wrote in his diary, “this would not in itself necessarily end the
war. Wars are conducted by the will of a population and that will can be at times a most
stubborn and practically unconquerable element.”269 The president believed that general
and nuclear war could not win the desired political outcome—peace. Gaining social
consensus for the United States’ ideology through political warfare would reduce the
potential for war by eliminating the opposing ideology of communism. However, the
military capability of nations also influenced public support, especially the psychological
aspects of how society viewed a potential nuclear war.
Eisenhower pursued a pragmatic approach to international relations in a
globalized world where confrontation and conflicting interests were inevitable. Likewise,
Ike advanced an enduring state of polarization between freedom and anything deemed a
threat to that freedom. The long-term focus of Eisenhower’s foreign policy during his
first year as president provides a perspective of how ideology, pragmatism, and American
values interact in the perpetual state of war “toward a lasting peace in a free and
prosperous world.”270 While Eisenhower’s legacy remains contested, most historians
agree that Ike’s grand strategy and foreign policy views were set in 1953. Eisenhower
wrote to his brother Milton in November 1953 that “it has been our general intention to
use 1953 largely as a period of study and formulation of programs. We have always felt
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that the ‘Administration Bible’ would be brought out for publication in the delivery of the
1954 message to Congress [State of the Union].”271
Historian Mary Dudziak argued that “a cultural framing of wartimes as discrete
and temporary occasions, destined to give way to a state of normality, undermines
democratic vigilance.”272 However, not identifying war as a specific time of socially
sanctioned violence serves the same end. If war is a state of normalcy then the popular
discourses of grand strategy, foreign policy, and national security would need to ignore
the distinction between war and peace. Yet, war time becomes an appealing idea in the
absence of grand strategy, perhaps because it allows society to embrace the militarization
and competitiveness that underlies American foreign policy. War as a distinct time is
inherent in the United States Constitution. Power is given to the president in a time of
war. Yet the fact that war’s purpose is not clearly defined presents obstacles. Eisenhower
made the informal distinction by determining if US troops would be involved. A useful
measure but what about the role of State Department officers or CIA personnel in the
conduct of political warfare? When the United States—or any nation—relies on coercive
diplomacy and political warfare, does the presence of ground combat troops signal a
substantial difference in purpose or aim? War stems from the cultural belief that violence
by the state on behalf of the majority justifies harming other human beings. While the
cultural foundation of war is not a discrete time, the application of that cultural construct
should be.
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No one would argue that a nation should not pursue its self-interest, but few will
acknowledge that self-interest can exist with international cooperation. Eisenhower’s
long-haul approach to Cold War grand strategy provides a useful perspective on the costs,
tensions, and effort required to formulate a grand strategy that promotes internationalism
while maintaining and building domestic politics focused on American individuality and
initiative.273
Eisenhower’s Middle Way inevitably left hardliners on the left and right
dissatisfied. Self-interest is a deceiving term because it creates the image of national
unity. Though critiques of national self-interest often sound pessimistic, they do provide a
useful way of understanding the difficulty in developing international interests. There
were competing international and national interests at play in Ike’s Middle Way. The
dominance of extremes in any country threatens war, much like the ideological Cold War
heightened the fear of war. Recognizing the futility of nuclear war to resolve such
differences, Eisenhower chose political warfare as the least destructive means to achieve
American interests.274 War had a place in international relations up to the point it
destroyed the very meaning of prosperity and existence.
While revisionists view Eisenhower as waging peace, and post-revisionists see the
darker, even cynical, side of Eisenhower’s foreign policy, there is another view that
applies equally today. There is no universal Middle Way of using war because peace and
war are largely a matter of perspective. From an American point of view, the threat or use
273
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of military force seem restrained, even benevolently used because American objectives
are equated with democracy and freedom.275 War is an instrument of coercive force that
is bounded by social consensus—moral, legal, and ethical. While the norms of jus in
bello rightfully govern actions in war, war’s legacy is judged by jus ad bellum. A just war
is based on perspective as well, the social consensus of what constitutes a reasonable aim
of sovereign nations. The American public expects policy to stem from serious
consideration of options and the effects. However, by developing strategy that relies on
military force, American leaders begin assessing options based on capabilities rather than
the feasibility of achieving the political objective. War centric planning also stifles
considerations about what options a nation’s opponent can realistically employ. While the
United States may consider an opponent’s move aggressive and the prelude to war, it
may simply be the only option that nation possesses to confront a global superpower. A
continual, and honest, reassessment of national interests, threats, means, and ends
prevents the narrowing of perspective. Eisenhower understood the contradiction—war
was as awful as it was useful.
Eisenhower’s administration provides a valuable example of policy analysis and
assessment. Even though historians note Project Solarium as a major step in
Eisenhower’s formulation of foreign policy, it is important to note that by September
1953—less than two months after Solarium—Eisenhower remarked to Dulles that “an
intensive study by the ablest group of individuals we can possibly assemble” should be
initiated to look at nuclear weapons, disarmament, and how it affected deterrence.276
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Eisenhower understood that the context of decision-making continuously changed and
therefore analysis never ended. While Kennedy’s National Security Advisor McGeorge
Bundy thought Eisenhower’s national security system and policy memos were “fairly
useless exercises,” the process enabled a larger number of people to provide perspective
on security issues.277
Grand strategy also reflects ideology—the meaning given to events through
popular culture and how it permeates politics, economics, military planning, and media.
Grand strategy is philosophical in its ideals but hopefully pragmatic in what can be
achieved. Feasibility is not merely the physical resources of a nation, but the ideological
barriers that influence public opinion, funding, and the policymaker’s identity. Decisions
are made to achieve practical and physical ends like security and economic prosperity,
but ideological beliefs can limit options or miscalculate policy effect. Ideology plays a
role in creating the identity—and intentions—of the other. During the Cold War the
Soviet Union—and communism in general—became defined by what the United States
was not.278 Journalist Chris Hedges referred to it as “negative space” identification—
creating a national identity based on what negative attributes the nation does not

276

Memorandum for the Secretary of State, dated September 8, 1953, DDE Diary Aug Sept. 1953
(1), box 3, DDE Diary Series AWF, Papers as President, 1951-1961, DDEL.
277
Bundy to Kennedy, January 24, 1961, “NSC, Organization and Administration, 1/1/611/25/61,” Departments and Agencies, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 3;
quoted in Kaplan, To Kill Nations, 163.
278

Chernus, Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace, 119.

99

project.279 This construction of American and Soviet identity acted as a lens through
which facts became distorted or misread.
While misreading the Soviet threat during the Cold War might be considered
paranoia, that does not mean security policies were unjustified. Lack of information and
intelligence does not confirm the absence of threat. It is a rational response in an
uncertain world to plan for the most dangerous scenario. However, how should policy
makers balance the need to maintain national security while dealing with varying levels
of intelligence regarding enemy capabilities and intentions? Arguably, this question is
most important before any form of war is initiated.
The definition of victory in war—the attainment of a policy objective—did not
change in Eisenhower’s mind with the emergence of nuclear weapons. Rather, the idea of
nuclear war lacked utility in Eisenhower’s mind given the purpose of war and its
connection to a political settlement. National survival could not be attained through the
use of nuclear weapons, only retaliatory destruction. Mutually assured destruction could
not achieve a state of peace better than the one prior to nuclear war.280
Ideology may drive decisions by limiting options, but also by requiring a decision.
The popular media’s portrayal of Iran and Guatemala as communist threats prompted a
response by the Eisenhower administration. Conflating the Soviet Union with any
communist movement, or leftist policies like land reform, led to perceived threats
broadening interests. Guatemalan policies that appeared leftist confirmed for many in
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Eisenhower’s administration that Guatemala had aligned itself with the Soviet Union.
Whereas Guatemala—and the rest of Latin America—did not register as a significant
interest in American grand strategy during the early Cold War, the potential for a Soviet
beachhead clearly expanded American interests.
In such actions overseas, Eisenhower remained aware of public opinion but
attempted to operate free of its containing force. He noted that “much of our so-called
“public opinion” is merely a reflection of some commentator’s reports which, as you so
well know, bear little relation to truth. By the same token, I believe that public opinion
based on such flimsy foundations can be changed rapidly, and I agree with you most
heartily that it must be changed by deeds.”281
Leaders have a responsibility to use rhetoric and information cautiously. Raising
support and funding for policies often requires more emotion than reason. American
society expects strength and decisiveness from the executive branch, especially in foreign
affairs. Ike noted that “in war there is scarcely any difficulty that a good resounding
victory will not cure—temporarily.”282 Yet, sometimes restraint is the wiser choice. How
can society identify the ideological forces that turn prudent caution and deliberation into
the “atrocious harmlessness” of not dropping bombs to overturn a foreign government?283
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The Munich analogy condemning any sign of negotiation or settlement has plagued every
administration from Harry S. Truman to Donald J. Trump.284
The New Look, and the larger Cold War, emerged due to competing ideologies in
global society. In On War, Clausewitz described war as a contest between duelists and
wrestlers. But what happens when one of the duelists refuses to participate? The coups in
Iran and Guatemala demonstrate the result of refusing to duel. Whereas the United States
and Soviet Union consented to duel with each other, Third World nations on the
periphery had no choice. War in the New Look was the global containment and
undermining of Soviet communism through every means of American society. Coercive
diplomacy thus morphed easily into political warfare. War was coercion—whether
physical force or consent to duel was present or not. Eisenhower may have waged war for
peace, but for the nations caught between the United States and the Soviet Union’s
ideologies, the Cold War was anything but peaceful.
National security often is driven more by domestic political ideology than the
foreign affairs typically associated with the term. If national security is about state
defense and survival, then the question must be asked: what is state survival and how do
social and cultural forces determine the range of that definition? There is a popular belief
that American society is too disconnected from the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Syria.285 Yet, after examining Eisenhower’s definition of war and how he waged it in Iran
and Guatemala, perhaps American society is not disconnected. National credibility is
284
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constructed by domestic and international audiences—to include the policy makers
concerned about, and attempting to measure, credibility. Does American society consider
its role in placing the burden of credibility on decision-maker’s? Rather than criticize the
limiting effects of domestic politics, a more useful practice would be to raise awareness
of how social and cultural values inform foreign policy decision making.286
Eisenhower avoided American society’s sanctioning of political violence when he
authorized the coups, but did America’s containment policy lend passive authorization?
Does a general belief that terrorism should be stopped allow the United States
government to wage a global war on terror? War is a social construct that justifies
violence on behalf of the majority.287 Legal precedent provides some semblance of order,
but Eisenhower understood that the passion of public opinion could force a decision for
war.288 Yet, even Eisenhower’s decision to wage covert warfare shows that he believed
that the public would not accept the spread of communism. Rather than satisfy the
American publics’ wishes in direct confrontation, Ike waged political and covert warfare
to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union. He hoped it would reduce frantic public
opinion that would call for nuclear war. Using covert violence to advance national selfinterest can lead to unethical and expansionist policies, but war is also governed by the
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passion of the people as Clausewitz observed. Is there a balance especially when the
current United States military doctrine puts all international relations on a spectrum of
cooperation-competition-conflict?289
Too often policies and plans are judged by their feasibility rather than the end
they are designed to achieve. This reflects the competing definitions of grand strategy: is
it an end or the framework by which decisions are made? Did Eisenhower define war by
its feasibility to achieve a military objective or a political settlement? While the
militarization of political rhetoric and diplomacy is an enduring legacy of Eisenhower’s
administration, it also shows that Eisenhower defined war in terms of its utility to achieve
policy ends. War took up where peaceful diplomacy left off.
The New Look shows the gap between the two concepts encapsulating the
definition of war. First, war is supposed to achieve something, most commonly identified
as a policy objective—a better political settlement than before the outbreak of war.
Second, war is the use of coercive force on a broad scale to influence the opposing
society’s political will. The gap between these two concepts of war grew dramatically in
the atomic age. Suddenly, a presumed means of war—nuclear weapons—no longer could
achieve a policy objective. Some did believe policy objectives could be achieved despite
the destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, Eisenhower argued that the political
settlement reached after nuclear war would not make for a meaningful peace. It is ironic
that in the aftermath of the Second World War’s destruction—and the monetary and
social cost to global society—that nuclear war advocates considered its potential
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destruction compatible with a better political settlement. True, Eisenhower did expand
and condone the expansion of war’s method to the limits of coercive diplomacy, staging
covert operations that destabilized the world with impacts still today. Yet, by identifying
and separating the purpose of war from the means of war, Eisenhower established a
policy that informed future administrations’ view of nuclear war and its relation to
American grand strategy. H.W. Brands’ conclusion that Eisenhower and his
administration “might have done better, but they might also have done much worse” does
not sound so simple considering the tensions present during the Cold War.290
While Eisenhower was right to question if American military power could
achieve policy objectives, a better question might have been, can America influence the
outcome at all? A question that cannot be answered until power is exerted; it is a question
that bears asking still today. What does America want? Why? And is it within her power
to direct the outcome? As war’s utility is determine by the policy objective, it is worth
studying and defining the policy objective before defining war. Perhaps as policy-makers
ponder those questions it would be wise to remember President Eisenhower’s counsel to
his close friend, General Al Gruenther: “Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing
could be worse than global war.”291
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